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ABSTRACT
THE INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALIST THOUGHT
ON THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
IN THE CONTEMPORARY “WAR ON TERRORISM”
FEBRUARY 2009
MICHAEL DOMINIC D'AMORE, B.A., MORAVIAN COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERISTY OF VERMONT
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor John Brigham
For the past fifty years, many scholarly works written on the subject of the
American political tradition conclude that the polity in the United States has adopted
many of the mores espoused in classical liberal thought. This dissertation examines the
influence of American Exceptionalist thought on American foreign policy in the age of
the contemporary “War on Terrorism.” The philosophy of American Exceptionalism has
influenced the planning of foreign policy decisions and as part of the rhetoric used to
explain those same decisions to the public. The Exceptionalist narrative has also
contributed to shaping the post-September 1 l lh relationship.between the United States
and the rest of the world.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
America in the Immediate Aftermath of the September 1 l' h Attacks'
Following the terrorist attacks of September 1 1, 2001, George W. Bush delivered
formal remarks from the Oval Office. Within his brief statement. Bush attempted to
make sense of the assaults that occurred earlier that day. Among Bush’s comments was
the firm and sure statement that “America was targeted for attack because we’re the
brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.”"
Nine days later Bush presented a formal address to a joint session of Congress and
a nationwide television audience. During his forty-minute speech he attempted to answer
the burning questions that were surely in the minds of many Americans - “Who attacked
our country?” and, more specifically, “why do they (the terrorists) hate us?” To the
second question Bush responded that the terrorists “hate our freedoms - our freedom of
religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each
1
The terms “America” and “American” are used often in this dissertation, mostly
in reference to the theoretical concept known as “American Exceptionalism.” Such
terminology is often too casually used within the U.S. as synonymous with the United
States of America. “America” more properly refers to the entirety of the Western
Hemisphere. When it is used in the former sense, the term “America” is parochial and
ethnocentric. I do not want to repeatedly use the term “America” in this dissertation
without, at least, calling for heightened awareness of both the implications that follow the
use of particular language in academic works and the often unspoken conceit that seems
to permeate political discourse in the United States. Since this dissertation is about
American Exceptionalism, I hope that such arrogance is not lost upon my readers.
2 George W. Bush, “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation,”
The Whitehouse, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200 1 /09/200 1091 1-1 6.html.
other."
Almost immediately. Bush's overly simple answers to the complex questions that
4
stemmed from the September 1 1th attacks were greeted with well-deserved criticism.
However, Bush received much more praise than criticism from the mainstream media.
Howard Kurtz of the Washington Post called Bush's September 20,h speech “rousing”
and “often inspirational.” Kurtz also noted “no pundit on the major networks uttered a
negative comment. They were, in a word, wowed.”5
Journalists were not the only individuals to heap praise upon Bush’s words. The
noted public intellectual Stephen E. Ambrose compared Bush to Winston Churchill and
predicted that his words would “resonate with the American people for a very long
5
George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American
People,” The Whitehouse, http://www.whitchousc.gov/ncws/releascs/200 1/09/200 10920-
8.html.
4
See the following sources for a sample of the critique leveled at Bush’s “our
freedoms” theory: for a series of interviews with citizens of various Middle Eastern
countries, see Peter Ford, “Why Do They Hate Us?,” Christian Science Monitor
,
September 27, 2001; for a list of indictments against U.S. intervention in the Middle East
since 1947, see Stephen Shalom, “The United States and the Middle East: Why do ‘They’
Hate Us?," Z Communications, http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/18505; for
another critique of U.S. foreign policy, specifically the relationship between the U.S. and
Israel, see Kenneth Zapp, “The Naivete of Asking ‘Why do They Hate Us So Much’?,”
Minneapolis Star Tribune
,
October 13. 2001
.
5 Howard Kurtz, “Bush Speech Wins Critics, Wins Praise,” Washington Post
,
September 21, 2001. The title of this piece is rather misleading, since there is little
mention of substantial criticism of Bush's speech in Kurtz’s article. In fact, Kurtz cites a
variety of glowing quotes on Bush’s remarks delivered by well-established members of
the mainstream media.
.
• »>6
time.
Some thought that Bush's comments may have lacked complexity, but they struck
a deep chord inside many Americans. It is likely that temporary feelings of shock, fear
and insecurity led some Americans to agree with Bush simply because he occupied a
position of authority. It is further possible that discriminatory feelings regarding race and
difference conditioned many Americans into accepting the premise of Bush’s argument.
However, I argue that there is another important reason for the widespread approval of
Bush’s words.
Bush's allusion to “our freedoms” seems to appeal less to the various tangible
freedoms that arc present in many liberal democracies than to the symbolic belief that the
American polity is set apart from the world because it is special, unique and normativcly
superior to all other nations. The president came very close to echoing the often quoted
words of Puritan leader John Winthrop who stated that “wee must Consider that wee shall
be as a Citty vpon a Hill, the eics of all people arc vppon vs wee shall be made a story
and a by-word through the world (sic).” 7 Such “city on a hill” language appeals to, and
often seeks to re-affirm, deeply ingrained exceptionalist assumptions shared by many
within the American polity.
The subject of this dissertation will be an examination oflhe often alleged
Brent Baker, “Bush Earns Rave Reviews for Speech,” Catholic Exchange,
http://catholicexchange.com/2001/09/21/84958.
7
John Winthrop, “A Model! of Christian Charity,” in The Puritans: A Sourcebook
of Their Writings, ed. Perry Miller & Thomas H. Johnson (Mineola, NY: Dover
Publications, 2001), 199.
3
existence of an unconscious, yel pervasive, pattern of common political thought within
the American polity. Scholars have often referred to this pattern of thought as “American
Exceptionalism.”
8
The focus of this paper will be to examine the influence of American
Exeeplionalist thought on contemporary U.S. foreign policy decision-making and the use
of American Exceptionalist rhetoric to explain U.S. policy decisions surrounding the
contemporary war on terrorism. In the process of developing the above thesis, I will also
discuss the effects of exceptionalist thought on the relationship between the United Stales
and the world since September 1 1 , 2001
.
To understand the relationship between American Exceptionalism and the rhetoric
employed by George W. Bush, let us begin with the examination of the particular word
“freedom.” The following dialogue is excerpted from the 1969 movie Easy Rider
:;
the
conversation takes places between George Hanson (played by Jack Nicholson) and Billy
(played by Dennis Hopper).
George Hanson: You know, this used to be a helluva good country. I can't
understand what's gone wrong with it.
Billy: Man, everybody got chicken, that's what happened. Hey, we can't even get
into like, a second-rate hotel, I mean, a second-rate motel, you dig? They think
we're gonna cut their throat or somethin'. They're scared, man.
s
Scholars credit Tocqueville with coining the term “America Exceptionalism,”
often pointing to the following quote: “The position of the Americans is therefore quite
exceptional, and it may be believed that no democratic people will ever be in a similar
one.” Quoted in Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America
,
ed. Richard D. Heffner
(New York: Mentor, 1991 ), 160. In addition, sec Judith Lichtenburg, “Precedent and
Example in the International Arena” (paper presented at the “Intervention: Then What?”
Conference, Carleton University. Ottawa, Ontario, October 3-5, 2003), 16. See also,
Michael Kammen, “The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration,”
American Quarterly 45 ( 1993): 7.
4
George Hanson: They're not scared of you. They're seared of what you represent
to 'em.
Billy: Hey. man. All we represent to them, man, is somebody who needs a haircut.
George Hanson: Oh. no. What you represent to them is freedom.
Billy: What the hell is wrong with freedom? That's what it's all about.
George Hanson: Oh. yeah, that's right. That's what's it's all about, all right. But
talkin' about it and bein' it. that's two different things. I mean, it's real hard to be
free when you are bought and sold in the marketplace. Of course, don’t ever tell
anybody that they’re not free, 'cause then they're gonna gel real busy killin' and
maimin’ to prove to you that they are. Oh. yeah, they're gonna talk to you. and talk
to you. and talk to you about individual freedom. But they see a free individual,
it's gonna scare 'em.
Billy: Well, it don't make 'em runnin' scared.
George Hanson: No, it makes 'em dangerous. ..
y
This dialogue illustrates a classic disconnect between theory and practice in
American politics. The concept of freedom is extolled and the word itself is rigorously
defended by many Americans. At the same time, this concept is an abstraction that is
completely devoid of any practical denotation. Many within the American polity
proclaim to uphold and defend freedom, but their actions indicate that they might not
fully understand the implication of such a statement.
When a group of individuals, such as members of the 1960s counterculture,
attempt to attach a material meaning to the word freedom, they are often vilified by many
Americans who consider themselves within the idcoloaical mainstream of American
politics. This presents us with a paradox - those who attempt to change freedom from a
concept into reality by giving it a definition (in the case of the counterculture, defying the
4
Internet Movie Database, “Memorable Quotes for Easy Rider,’' The Internet
Movie Database (IMDb), http://www.imdb.eom/title/tt0064276/quotes.
5
social, economic and political traditions of their parents' generation) face persecution at
the hands of individuals who extol the word “freedom" hut loath the manifestation of it.
Freedom is an abstraction for the persecutors in the above example. Rather than
representing a material state of existence with specifically defined liberties for
individuals, “freedom" possesses no specific meaning beyond its apparent “American-
ness.” We can see the development of a circularly logical argument: Freedom is
inherently American and America is the birthplace of freedom. This, of course, tells us
nothing about either the nature of “freedom" or the American political tradition.
To develop a mature understanding of both freedom as a theoretical concept and
the American political tradition in general, we must move beyond the often accepted
rhetoric of American Exceptional ism. Exceptionalist rhetoric generally serves to cloud
the discussion and often it also brings reasonable debate to a screeching halt. In this
dissertation, I will attempt to add my voice to an ongoing reasonable debate involving the
discussion over the nature of theoretical constructs such as “freedom" and the proper
place of such constructs in the larger American political tradition.
Outline of the Dissertation
In the subsequent chapter, I will briefly discuss the intellectual roots of the theory
of American Exceptional ism. I will focus upon members of the Cold War Era
“Consensus" School of American Exceptional ism, such as Richard Hofstadter, Daniel
Boorstin and Louis Hartz. The consensus theorists are important because they were the
most ardent adherents to the Exceptionalist tradition and, as such, would become
indispensable if unwitting influences upon the development of the brand of
6
neoconservalivc thought that is dominant among the primary decision makers in the
second Bush administration. 10
In this dissertation, I am using the term neoconservative to define a variant upon
traditional conservatism that became noteworthy in the late twentieth century.
Neoconservatives often prioritize foreign policy issues above domestic policy;
occasionally “neocons” openly disagree with traditional conservatives on social issues,
but these issues are rarely prioritized in the neoconservative world view.
Neoconservatives have become the primary backers of an aggressive and often
unilateral military policy. In fact, the prime objective of neoconservatism appears to be
the projection of American military power around the globe with the goal of maintaining
the United States as the unipolar power in the international arena. Neoconservatives play
a significant role in the current Bush White House, especially in matters of foreign policy
planning and implementation."
Examples of neoconservative thinkers would be Irving Krislol, his son William.
10
Sources on the Consensus Theorists will include: Daniel J. Boorstin. The
Genius ofAmerican Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1953), Louis Hartz, The
Liberal Tradition in America (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991 ), Louis
Hartz, The Founding ofNew Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. 1964),
Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men who Made It (New
York: Knopf, 1948).
11
Sources on the association between the George W. Bush administration and
neoconservatism, see Didier Chaudet, "The Ncoconscrvative Movement at the End of the
Bush Administration: Its Legacy, Its Vision, Its Political Future" (paper presented at the
annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, CA, USA, March
26. 2008). For connections between the consensus theorists and neoconservatives, see
Alan Wolfe, “The Revolution that Never Was,” The New Republic . June 7, 1999), 42.
7
Charles Krauthammer, Charles Murray, Richard Pcrle. Daniel Pipes and Norman
Podhorctz. The elder Kristol founded The Public Interest , the first journal that catered to
what would become known as neoconservative ideas; Kristol is considered the founding
|
T
father of neoconservatism by many supporters and detractors alike.
The third chapter will discuss more recent approaches to the study of American
Exceptionalism. There are two contemporary trends that I will highlight in Chapter
Three.
First, I will examine the evolving thought of a long-standing adherent to the
theory of American Exceptionalism. Seymour Martin Lipset stands out because of his
large volume of work on the subject of American Exceptionalism. Lipset revisited the
relevance of exceptionalist thought in the post-Cold War Era. His conclusions will
certainly prove indispensable to a sophisticated understanding of the impact of
Exceptionalism in the aftermath of September I l"'.
In his recent works, Lipset noted that while the United Slates moved closer to
adopting public controls over economic matters in the mid-20th century, it never came
close to developing a comprehensive European-style social welfare policy. In fact, Lipset
claimed that European political thought had begun to resemble the American version of
classical liberal political thought by the end of the 20th century. Lipset cited
contemporary European political movements, such as the “third way" centrism supported
“ For a brief overview of the neoconservative philosophy, see Irving Kristol,
“The Neoconservative Persuasion," American Enterprise Institute for Pubic Policy
Research, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20030820_15676Kristolgraphics.pdf.
8
by the likes of British Prime Minister Tony Blair and German Chaneellor Gerhard
Schroder as support lor his thesis. 1 ’
If Europeans arc beginning to act more like Americans in their political
relationships, does that make the United States less “exceptional?” Lipsct stated that the
“United States clearly is no longer as exceptional politically as it once was (y)ct for
all that, the United States remains exceptional in other important ways. It is still an
outlier at one end of many international indicators of behavior and values.” 14
Furthermore, Lipset added that such distinctions between the U.S. and other nation-states
are clearly not always positive; rather, he notes that in many ways American
Exceptional ism is a “double-edged sword.” 15
Second, I will examine the relationship between American Exceptionalism and
conservative political theory. 1 will focus, on two particularly different conservative
theories by looking at two of the most notable interpretations of the post-Cold War global
order. The two theorists that 1 will examine arc Francis Fukuyama and his “End of
History” thesis and Samuel Huntington and his “Clash of Civilizations” thesis.
In 1989, Fukuyama wrote his historic essay “The End of History?” as Soviet
15 Seymour Martin Lipset, “Still the Exceptional Nation?,” Virtu c Fortuna 1,
http://mai1intanakal.blogspot.com/2007/01/still-exceptional-nation-by-seymour.html
15
I will be examining Lipset's recent works, particularly Seymour Martin Lipset,
American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996) and
Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks, It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed
in the United States, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000).
9
Communism was collapsing in Eastern Europe. Using Hegelian language, Fukuyama
predicted that the demise of Soviet Communism would usher in "the end point of
mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as
the final form of human government.”
Effectively, Fukuyama was articulating a transcendent version of American
Exccptionalism. For him, the exceptional United States had overwhelmed its greatest
enemy and, in the process, transformed the ideological structures of the entire globe into
its own image and likeness.
Since the 1992 publication of his theory in full book form, Fukuyama has
tempered his perspective. In the aftermath of the September I l lh attacks, Fukuyama
reversed himself on the question of the inevitability of history and furthermore, he
claimed that the impact of organizations such as Al-Qaeda compels Westerners to ask
"real questions about the viability of our civilization.”
17
In 2006, Fukuyama appeared to temper his original thesis even more with a hard-
hitting critique of the neoconservative movement and the role of the neo-cons in
promoting the current Iraq War. However, in spite of Fukuyama's clear attempt to adjust
his thesis, the original declaration of the "end of history” provides political inspiration for
those who chose to adopt the messianic style of foreign policy associated with the
1(1
Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?,” The National Interest
.
Summer
1989,4.
17
Francis Fukuyama, “Has History Started Again,” Policy, Winter 2002, 3. Also,
see Francis Fukuyama, "The End of American Exccptionalism,” New Perspectives
Quarterly, October 200 1
.
10
I s
administration of George W. Bush.
Unlike Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington did not declare the end of the Cold War to
he the end of “history.” Rather, Huntington suggested that serious conflicts would
remain part of the new global order; the nature of such conflicts, however, would be
fundamentally cultural instead of political or economic. 19
Huntington does not refer to an “American” civilization, specifically; however he
does discuss the distinctive elements of “Western” civilization, as he defines it. Aspects
of Western culture highlighted by Huntington, such as “individualism, liberalism,
constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, rule of law, democracy, free markets
(and) the separation of church and state,” are strikingly similar to the traditionally
“exceptional” traits thought to be dominant within the American polity."
Huntington’s theory of civilizations lacks the messianic qualities found in
Fukuyama. For Huntington, America will not conquer all with the superiority of its
culture. However, Huntington does provide us with an important construct that
doubtlessly influenced neoconservative foreign policy practitioners - the partitioning of
the globe into separate and rival camps.
1
8
Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the
Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven: Yale University, 2006).
19
Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs, Summer
1 993, 22.
2,1
Ibid., 40. The definition of Western Civilization is subjective. Huntington
politically defined Western Civilization as the nation-states of Western Europe and
nation-states with political and social institutions that were heavily influenced by
Western Europe, including the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
Emad El-Din Aysha concluded that Huntington's thesis, like the theory of
American Exceptionalism, stressed the existence of and the need for “political unity” and
“cultural homogeneity" within the subject population 21 Such core ideals encourage the
adoption of and support for a foreign policy based upon the principle that “(e)ithcr you're
for us or you're against us."
-2
In the fourth chapter, I will examine the influence of American Exceptionalist
thought on U.S. policy following the September 1 l lh terrorist attacks. I will analyze the
discourse surrounding the “new normal” standard of American life on the home front
during the contemporary war on terror. I expect to find that current U.S. policy is
presented to the average citizen by appealing to Americans’ sense of themselves as
unique and superior to other nations.
In the fifth chapter, I will examine the condition of American Exceptionalism in
the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September I I lh . I will consider the economic,
political and social position of the United States and its citizens. This examination will
reflect on America domestically and also on the role of the United States within the larger
global community.
As a corollary to the main argument in this chapter, I plan to consider the image
of the United States abroad. I anticipate finding that the image of America has been
21 Emad El-Din Aysha, “Samuel Huntington and the Geopolitics of American
Identity: The Function of Foreign Policy in America’s Domestic Clash of Civilizations,”
International Studies Perspectives 4 (2003): 1 13.
" 2 George W. Bush, “President Unveils Back to Work Plan." The Whitehouse,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200 1 / 1 0/200 1 1 004-8.html.
tarnished by the sense that the United States is profoundly arrogant coneerning its
perceived uniqueness in the world.
My concluding chapter will discuss the potential for moving beyond the
Exceptional ist myth. Included in that chapter will be an examination of the contemporary
thought of Rogers Smith. Smith has argued that the American Exceptional ists were too
narrow in their focus on a particular set of social relations. When a multitude of social
relations is examined. Smith asserts, it becomes apparent that there are multiple political
traditions within the American polity."
Several of these traditions (e.g., the maintenance of slavery long after its
disappearance in the remainder of the Western world, the denial of citizenship and voting
rights) are not at all valorous, especially when compared to the self-serving nature of the
traditions trumpeted by the American Exceptionalisls. However, recognition of these
multiple traditions, with warts and all, gives Americans an important sense of agency
over their political luture."
Smith's “multiple traditions” theory challenges the doctrine of American
Exceptionalism in a most profound way. If the Exceptionalisls are correct in their
argument that America is unique and its polity is hopelessly enslaved to the classical
liberal tradition, then we can infer that there is little hope for the successful
implementation of fundamental policy changes. However, if there is evidence that there
23 Rogers M. Smith, “Beyond Tocqueville. Myrdal and Hartz: The Multiple
Traditions in America,” American Political Science Review 87 (1993): 549-550.
24
Ibid., 550.
13
are multiple traditions and these traditions have figured prominently at various historic
moments, then prospects for fundamental change are significant and Americans have the
opportunity to re-fashion their polity based upon a different narrative.
In my conclusion, I plan to address Smith’s prescription for a less “exceptional”
America and I will also provide my own thoughts on the prospects for a post-
Exceptionalist United States. Finally, I will discuss the benefits of accepting a different
narrative, particularly the positive impact that a new American narrative might have on
the global perception of the United States.
14
CHAPTER 2
THE INTELLECTUAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
Introduction
As noted in the previous chapter, cxceptionalist interpretations of the American
experience can be traced back to the Puritans. However, it was intellectuals during the
Cold War era who attempted to find a modern application for the long-standing belief
that the American polity is a unique institution in world politics. In this chapter, 1 will
discuss the major figures that gave birth to the modern conception of American
Exceptionalism and I will further explain their influence upon the accepted wisdom
concerning Exceptionalism.
One should not be surprised to find an explicitly cxceptionalist conception
develop during the 1950s since the political thought of this period was dominated by the
bi-polar global relationship between the United Stales and the Soviet Union. Scholars,
like many Americans, were searching for a model that could explain the comparative
differences between the conflicting world-views championed by these two dominant
nation-states.
Each olThe first three sections of this chapter will briefly examine a theory
presented by one of the major Exceptionalist thinkers of this time. The final section of
the chapter will discuss the major similarities among the various brands of early
Exceptionalism. In addition, I will attempt to point out the features of each theory which
impact the most upon the discussion of the role of the United States in the post-
September 1 l" 1 world.
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Richard Hofstadter and The American Political Tradition
Richard Holsladlcr can reasonably be considered Ihc first Cold War Consensus
theorist. As a young man, Hofstadter was influenced by the materialist analysis of
history advocated by Charles Beard and others during the Progressive Era. He was active
in the American Communist Party before World War II, but did not remain a member for
very long. By the late 1940s, Hofstadter had abandoned leftist political ideology but
largely maintained a classical Marxian approach as his primary tool of historical
25
inquiry.
In 1948. Hofstadter wrote The American Political Tradition and the Men Who
Made It, the first major post-World War II work dealing with the question of American
Exceptionalism. Hofstadter's book was a compilation of twelve biographical portraits of
American leaders, some of whom initially appeared to reside outside of the political
mainstream of their time. Hofstadter concluded that all of the men profiled in his book
held political ideas that were strikingly similar to one another in spite of the common
perception that they qualified as ideological outliers from the norm. 26
The main thesis of this work is Hofstadter’s argument that the leaders featured in
his book are a microcosm of the entirety of American political thought. In his
biographical profiles, he attempted repeatedly to demonstrate that the parochial political
differences which surface at given moments in American history were not systemic
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conflicts but were actually minor policy disagreements. Furthermore, Hofstadler asserted
that such seemingly significant policy disagreements occurred between factions and
leaders who ultimately shared a multitude of fundamental assumptions.
"
The American political scene, according to Hofstadter, was marked by a "series of
conflicts between special interests” rather than between socio-economic classes. He
claimed that both professional historians and casual observers of American social history
often miss this point because they focus upon the ferocity of the conflict at various
moments in the past. Historians, he believed, placed conflict “in the foreground” while
“commonly shared convictions (were) neglected.
”
2S
Hofstadler’ s project in the book was
to offer a counter-argument to the majority of historians who, he believed, wrongly
focused on minor conflicts rather than on the significant consensus . 29
He reasoned that the intense and sometimes violent moments in American history
were not revolutionary moments. Rather, these dramatic moments camouflaged the
fundamental nature of struggle in American politics; political conflict has often been
among elites over narrow points of divergence within their own ranks . 30 He stated that
"beyond temporary and local conflicts there has been a common ground, a unity of
cultural and political tradition, upon which American civilization has stood .” 31
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Hofstadtcr asserted that major political leaders and the movements that they
championed over the years displayed strikingly similar core beliefs. For him, these core
beliefs were primarily economic and, furthermore, distinctly capitalistic. The shared
assumptions included a rather strict adherence to three principles: “the right to property,
the philosophy of economic individualism (and) the value of competition .”32
Based upon his observations, Hofstadtcr reasoned that a unique political culture
developed within the United States as a result of the near consensus on fundamental
political values. He claimed that the “range of ideas” in American political discourse was
narrow and limited by the common assumptions that were held by all but a small group of
“dissenters and alienated intellectuals .” 33
In this unique political culture, procedural democracy and the accompanying
equality of opportunity for all citizens are often lauded as a fundamental feature of the
American tradition. However, Hofstadtcr pointed out that democracy was seen as an
important value because it provided opportunities for the personal enrichment of the
isolated individual. From his observations, he concluded regrettably that the collective or
fraternal aspect of democracy appeared to be neglected in the American political scene . 34
For Hofstadtcr, traditional American individualism and the propensity to focus
upon the strictly procedural aspects of democracy combined to foster a culture that has
been “intensely nationalistic and for the most part isolationist.” In addition, he claimed
that “it has been fiercely individualistic and capitalistic” as well. 15
Daniel Boorstin and The Genius ofAmerican Politics
If Hofstadter is correct that there is a clearly rigid consensus in American political
thought, the next question should be how and why did such uniformity in political
thought development in the United States? Daniel Boorstin offered one possible answer
to this philosophical mystery.
Boorstin was both a legal scholar and a professor of history at the University of
Chicago. Much like Hofstadter, Boorstin was a proponent of left-wing politics as a
young man, but he clearly drifted away from socialist thought or any other definitive
ideology by the 1950s. In fact, his book The Genius ofAmerican Politics, written in
1953, trumpeted his belief that the American polity lacked a strong political ideology of
any kind. Boorstin wrote Genius early in his intellectual career, but its stands as both his
most overtly political and his most explicitly cxceptionalist statement.
For Boorstin. the foundation of America's philosophic “genius” is the unqualified
simplicity of American political thought. He clearly assumed that his consideration of
American politics as “genius” diverged fundamentally from the standard philosophic
analysis which focused upon a few extraordinary intellectuals who wrote memorable
treatises. Quite the contrary, Boorstin asserted that American political thought qualified
5
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as “genius” in spile of its lack of both philosophical giants and an original canon.
Boorslin's assertions lead him into a puzzling paradox that lie attempted to
overcome in the course of his book. Early in Genius
,
he stated that Americans hold a
firm belief that “political life (in the United States) was based on a perfect theory;” yet,
he further asserted that “no nation has ever been less interested in political philosophy or
produced less in the way of theory." 77
For the remainder of the text, Boorstin endeavored to solve the political paradox
between the intuitive sense that the American nation was built upon the perfect theory
and the general aloofness of most Americans toward the musings of intellectuals and
philosophers. In so doing he claimed to have discovered the source of both the
• ™
uniqueness and the greatness in American political life.
For Boorstin, the source of the American consensus was a phenomenon he called
“givenness.” Boorstin defined this concept as the belief in values that “are in some way
or other automatically defined: given by certain facts of geography or history particular to
us.” He further asserted that there was both a distinctive “American Way of Life” and an
inimitable “American Way of Thought.” These exceptional social and cultural traits
were “given” or born out of the unique material conditions found on the American
3(i
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continent.
Boorstin hypothesized that faith in the “givenness” of concrete American ideals is
so strong that certain political characteristics appear to he interconnected with the United
States itself. He staled that Americans:
have been told again and again, with the metaphorical precision of poetry, that the
United States is the land of the free. Independence, equality, and liberty, we like
to believe, are breathed in with our very air .
40
Furthermore, lie asserted that Americans tend to think of political conditions such as
equality, liberty and democracy as distinctively possessions of the United Slates . 41
What if Boorstin is correct that the average American sees a distinction between
"American equality” and garden-variety equality or “American democracy” and
rudimentary democracy? ~ If this is the case, then the political terminology in question
becomes devoid of its literal meaning. Instead the term is given an abstract definition by
its American interpreter; equality, for example, is nothing more than “American-ness”
and “American-ness” is all about equality. The above statement is tautological and,
potentially, susceptible to manipulation by those who profess to be the keepers and
defenders of The American Way of Life.
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The Source of “Givenness”
Boorstin based his notion of “givenness” on a key assumption about the American
polity. Above all, he asserted, Americans tend to believe that the history of their land is
strikingly homogeneous. While admitting that this common set of assumptions is
actually the product of poor historical analysis, Boorstin stated that this widespread
ahistorical perspective is one of the fundamental factors in the strong feeling of cultural
continuity throughout American development. 4 '
Boorstin asserted that a noticeably orthodox political tradition developed as a
result of the dominant paradigm in the American political tradition. Furthermore,
Boorstin claimed that the existence of an American orthodoxy becomes obvious when
one examines the markedly unique political behavior of citizens of the United States. 44
One example Boorstin outlined to support his orthodoxy hypothesis was the
number of fanatical and capricious “heresy-hunts” throughout American history.
Historical moments such as the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts, the post-World
War I Red Scare and the McCarthy era were prime examples cited by Boorstin as
classical American heresy-hunts.43
Heresy-hunts are not uncommon in modern history, but in most nation-states such
repressive action is inflicted upon practitioners of an explicit political philosophy by their
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ideological rivals. In America, Boorstin stated, those accused of political heresy are not
branded in accordance with their ideology, rather, they are accused of “acts of
irreverence” against the “American creed.”46
In other words, the supposed heretics are seen as more than ideological enemies
within the same polity; they are accused of possessing ideas that arc foreign to the
“American way.” Furthermore, the alleged heretics arc proclaimed to be anti- or un-
American. Boorstin claimed that this tendency is unique to the United States. Simply
stated, he wrote that ‘“un-Italian' or ‘un-French'” are not terms used in the same way as
un-American.47
Boorstin stated that even intellectuals are prone to criticize the alleged heretics
within their midst. He cited critical attacks launched against Charles A. Beard's class
analysis of the American Constitution as a prime example of the kind of heresy-hunts that
took place inside the hallowed halls of academia.
In addition to heresy-hunts, Boorstin also cited the cherished constitutional
doctrine of “original intent” as another illustration of the conspicuous orthodoxy within
American politics. Boorstin argued that only in America could such a doctrine
persistently be taken seriously by intellectuals as well as common citizens. By contrast,
46
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lie stated that no “sensible Briton would say that his history is the unfolding of the truths
implicit in Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights. ,,4
‘
;
The American Orthodoxy: Consensus and Continuity in History
Much like Hofstadter, Boorstin asserted that there was a conspicuous consensus
of political thought throughout American history. However, unlike Hofstadter, who
began his examination of American political philosophy with the American Revolution,
Boorstin traced the American Consensus back to the Puritans.
The Puritans, Boorstin said, created a philosophy that conformed to their life in
the American wilderness. In effect, the Puritan conception of political life was a creed
designed to fit a society that possessed a direct relationship with nature. 50
Because they were living in an environment that was extremely foreign to their
European sensibilities, Boorstin claimed that the Puritans were compelled to develop
techniques that allowed them to subdue and conquer their surroundings. In addition to
material adaptations, Boorstin stated that the thought patterns of the Puritans were
focused around their competition with nature and with the obstacles that emanate from it.
From these Puritan origins, Boorstin stated, a distinct pattern of political thinking
developed within the American polity. As decades and centuries passed by, this pattern
of thought became cemented into the minds of subsequent generations of Americans.' 1
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The American Revolution, which Boorstin said was "hardly a revolution at all”
rather “merely a colonial rebellion,” did not pose a challenge to this political consensus.
"
Boorstin claimed that, unlike the French Revolution of the same era, the American
Revolution was conservative and legalistic in its origin. He asserted that the revolt
against the British monarch was philosophically similar to the 17 lh century struggle of the
British Parliament over the same authority. According to Boorstin, there was no radical
departure in ideology with this revolution; rather it was simply a successful attempt to
institute British Constitutional governance in the American colonies. 53
Similarly, Boorstin claimed that the Civil War, while a tremendous cataclysm in
American history, did not mark a significant ideological departure from the American
consensus. Much like the American Revolution, Boorstin stated that the political
discourse surrounding the Civil War was mostly legalistic wrangling between two
geographic territories within a large nation-slate. Boorstin asserted that instead of two
competing sides with distinctly different world-views, the Civil War was a conflict
between two sides that saw themselves as fighting for their specific legal rights within an
already established political framework. The framework, Boorstin said, remained static
and unchallenged by cither side during this titanic struggle. 54
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Consensus in Both Politics and Religion
In addition to tracing the American philosophical consensus thought history,
Boorstin provided a thorough analysis of the unique relationship between religion and
politics in the United Slates. He identified what he believed to be an important
correlation between the philosophic consensus and the frequent “mingling of religious
and political thought” in America/ 5
Boorstin stated that an overt expression of religious faith was essential for any
individual who wished to have a significant political impact on America. He said that “it
is important to be a member of a church... (w)hich particular church is far less
important .”
56
For Boorstin, the parallel between politics and religion was simple, yet
enlightening. Political life thrived in the United States in spite of the noticeable lack of a
sophisticated pursuit toward a guiding political ideology. Similarly, he said that “religion
nourishes in this country” while “theology and religious studies languish." 7
In sum, Boorstin considered the general acceptance of religion and the equally
wide-ranging rejection of theology as significant reinforcement for the existence of his
doctrine of “givenness.” Basically, he asserted that Americans find it unnecessary and
often disadvantageous to adopt an overarching theory that explains political, social or
even spiritual relations. All eneompassing theories are extraneous hceause they believe
that certainty is imbued in the institutions of this continent.
The Impact of “Givenness" on American Political Thought
Boorstin’s conclusions concerning the impact of “givenness" on American
politics arc as distinctive as his observations of the political scene in the United States.
Based upon Boorstin's observations, one could potentially build the foundation for a
scathing critique of the American polity and the naivete of its citizens concerning their
history and political relations. However, rather than finding fault with the uniqueness of
American politics, Boorstin celebrated it and considered it to be a mark of inherent
“genius."
Boorstin claimed that there was profundity in the apparent simplicity of
American politics. He explained his conclusions with an analogy; he compared the
perceived political consensus with the religious practice of the Ancient Hebrews.
Boorstin stated that:
When the Temple of Solomon in Jerusalem fell in 63 B.C. and Pompey invaded
the Holy of Holies, he found to his astonishment that it was empty. This was, of
course, a symbol of the absence of idolatry, which was the essential truth of
Judaism. Perhaps the same surprise awaits the student of American culture, if he
finally manages to penetrate the Arcanum of our belief.
w
For Boorstin, the lack of “idolatry" in American politics can be found in the
perceived wide-ranging rejection of essentialist political theories along with the general
Ibid., 133 and 137-8.
Ibid., 170.
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acceptance of a theory-less philosophical consensus. He claimed that the rejection of
ideological idolatry discouraged political attempts to overhaul society based upon grand
visions of human nature and human social relations. Instead, our tendency to dismiss
theoretic idols fostered a healthy pragmatism and a (small e) conservative tendency in
American politics. The result of such a traditionalist consensus is that perspectives on the
extremes of the political spectrum remain rather unpopular and quite unlikely to disrupt
the smooth functioning of the polity/'0
Furthermore. Boorstin asserted that the combination of a lack of political idolatry
and the strong sense of historical continuity led many Americans to consider the United
States a nation of destiny. He referred to this feeling of destiny as “seamlcssness.” As
with “givenness”, he viewed the perceived phenomenon of “seamlessness” as a positive
value because it cultivated a feeling of togetherness and unity in the American polity/1 '
At the beginning and again in the closing pages of his book, Boorstin provided
one final observation that will be very important for our study of American
Exceptionalism. He asserted that the unique “genius" of American politics, literally, is
one of a kind and cannot be replicated in other nation-states. Materially and historically,
he stated, America is different and separate from the remainder of the world, including
the Western world. Just as European political ideologies did not play well in America,
our American pragmatism could not be exported to countries that did not share in our
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unique history and geography.
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As he constructed his argument, however, Boorstin seemingly glossed over a
potential weakness in his theory. He did not take into account that while both
“givenness" and “seamlessness" represented a repudiation of a classical philosophical
orthodoxy they also, in effect, represented a political theory in their own right. As we
continue this exploration of American Exceptionalism, we must make room for the
possibility that the American consensus may very well be an ideology as meaningful as
the various theories developed in Western Europe.
Louis Hart/ and the Liberal Tradition in America 1
Our next theorist would also argue that there was a resilient political consensus in
American politics. Yet, in contrast to Boorstin, he would define that consensus in
ideological terms. Louis Hart/, was a Harvard professor who, like Hofstadter and
Boorstin, had a background in socialist thought. However, by the 1950s, Hart/ had
completely abandoned the idea that socialism could have a meaningful impact upon the
American political scene.
Hartz's most important contribution to the study of political theory was his
attempt to explain the development of political ideology in the regions of the world that
were conquered and colonized by Europeans. Hartz claimed that nations such as the
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United States, Canada, South Africa, Australia, and the countries of Latin America
developed into societies that were "fragments" of their European colonizers.
<vl
In terms of political ideology. Hart/, asserted that these new nations became stuck
in time and developed a political culture that almost unquestionably accepted the
philosophy of its European conquerors at the time of the original settlement. Hart/ stated
that the acceptance of the founding ideology in these new societies was so deep that it
sank "beneath the surface of thought to the level of an assumption."
05
For the purposes of this study, we will concentrate on Hartz's analysis of the
American political culture. Hartz claimed that the United States presents "the clearest
case." among the European fragments, of the ideological dominance of liberalism. 00
Based on historical development and recorded patterns of political action in the
United States, Hartz concluded that political conflicts in America are framed by a rigidly
defined liberal tradition. He claimed that political debate in America is often nothing
more than superficial disagreements between factions that share the same Lockean
presuppositions. Hartz's thought is based on the premise that the lack of a dominant
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feudal experience in America caused this particularly fixed ideology of liberalism to
. 67
mature.
If Americans are "born equal" 0 * as Hart/, theorized then they arc born without the
residue the socio-political hierarchy indicative of feudalism. Americans also lack another
remnant of feudalism; simply, a sense that each social class, from the most dominant to
the most submissive, is reliant upon the others for its continued existence. The important
tendencies of a feudal residue, which Hartz's claimed was missing in America, included a
history of communal social arrangements, a feeling of class identity, a sense of both
competing and cooperative class interests, and a background in internal revolutionary
process.
Hartz explained that due to this distinctly equal and individualistic existence,
alternatives to liberalism, such as socialism, seem alien to Americans. Such alternatives,
lie stated, often arc rejected out of hand by Americans because they are based on a strong
sense of communal relations and class identity -- two traits that are missing in American
life and culture.
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Locke’s Impact on the United States
In The Liberal Tradition in America, Hartz presented his argument in great detail.
Once again, he argued that the United Slates is a unique example of the practice and
socialization of the classical liberal doctrine, specifically the liberalism expressed in the
writings of the English philosopher John Locke. According to Hartz, the United States is
a bastion for an uncritical acceptance of the liberal norm. This is a norm that Americans
perceive to be inherent in any "good and just" society, and an unspoken, yet prevalent
aspect of their own national identity.
Furthermore, Hartz claimed that Americans, in general, were not standard, garden
variety Lockean liberals, but rather, "irrational" Lockeans. 70 Americans are irrational
Lockeans simply because "the American Way of Life (is) a nationalist articulation of
Locke which usually docs not know that Locke himself is involved." 71
Locke's theory of liberalism comprises two distinct arguments. The first half of
Locke's argument is an implicit defense of the state as legitimate because it is the entity
created by the common consent of the masses. For Locke, the state is the exclusive
purveyor of coercive power via the social contract. The execution of this power in an
attempt to serve the needs and wants of the polity is entirely appropriate as long as the
state complies with the limitations of the contract. “
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The obligation of the state to use its powers within the confines of the social
contract is the second half of Locke's theoretical claim. This portion of Locke' theory
involves the explicit limitation of state power over the individual citizen. Hartz asserted
that this second claim is the only part of Locke acknowledged in the American political
community. 73
According to this thesis, Americans, in general, operate within the framework of
this second Lockean supposition alone. Hartz claimed that the "master assumption of
American political thought" was behind this ideology. Unlike Europe, where the liberal-
enlightenment concepts of individuality and social liberty were subject to furious debate,
the basic belief in "atomistic social freedom" is unquestioned in America. Hartz asserted
that the main reason for this bold assumption was the unique social situation that the new
settlers found on this continent. Once again, we are made to understand that the
Europeans who colonized America discovered a land without feudal traditions, or, for
Hartz, any traditions at all.
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Because of this veritable state of nature, social freedom was won by the new
Americans on an individual or small group level, not through mass party participation
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and social revolution, as was the case in Europe. There were no feudal lords here, just an
indigenous population, whose land was ripe for occupation. The American settlers’
response to this situation was to enter into a "social contract," the first being The
Mayflower Compact. 77
As the settlers migrated across the American frontier, this liberal right of founding
was entered into again and again. Unlike Europe, the establishment of a political society
in America was not brought about by the popular usurpation of state power and the
subsequent struggle to change the rules of government and law. Rather, it came into
being through a series of individual claims to a given area and the enforcement of that
requisition by the same individuals who laid claim to it.
In this sense, free people came first in America and then they were followed by
the development of the state through a social contract. The state, therefore, is perceived
as an outside force - one that primarily seeks to constrain liberty and only secondarily
provides for the general welfare in compensation for that loss of liberty. The balance
between the Lockean conception of a state that equally constrains, protects and provides
is not present in standard American political discourse.
The Prevalence of Liberalism in American History
Because of this imbalance, Hartz asserted that American political development is
skewed toward fear and distrust of the state. This unique attitude toward the state brings
an equally unique history to America; any government action beyond the basic tasks of
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defending (lie nation and its inhabitants has always been held in suspect. The concept of
government playing a profound social role in public affairs is not often a topic of
consideration in our political discourse because the will of the individual is almost always
considered sacrosanct. It is commonly held that the rugged individual can rely only on
her/himself in her/his relentless "pursuit of happiness."
Therefore, the quest for improved living conditions is isolated to the domain of
the individual in America. Pulling oneself up by one’s “bootstraps” is the only
acceptable means of upward mobility. At the same time, the legitimacy of the state
providing for the social welfare of its citizens is tempered by the belief that the state is
almost always a hostile actor and almost always seeks to limit individual rights when its
acts.
It follows from this perception, that various possibilities for social advancement
through state involvement arc rarely perceived by Americans as worth the accompanying
erosion of individual rights at the hands of the state. As a result of this unique political
outlook, the scope of social welfare policy in the United States has been limited when
compared to the nation-states of Western Europe.
Hart/, claimed that the prevailing liberal paradigm in America overwhelmed state-
oriented and community-based methods of social action throughout American history.
Hartz devoted the bulk of his book. The Liberal Tradition in America, to illustrating this
effect of irrational Lockcanism. Once again, his assertion was that the prevalence of
American liberalism and its accompanying distaste for state power shaped American
35
development. Liberalism in America ultimately led to the exclusion of alternatives
considered in other parts of the developed world, such as socialist democracy.
The American Revolution
Much like Hofstadter and Boorstin, Hartz tells the story of the American
Revolution in decidedly non-revolutionary terms. The colonists liberated the continent
from British rule and formalized the tenants of liberalism into a federal system of
government. However, unlike their fellow liberal revolutionaries in France only a decade
later, Americans did not need to unite on the basis of class or any similar identity to
destroy an indigenous feudal elite in a bloody revolution.
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The American Revolution was a war to revise an antiquated social contract
between the colonists and their British lords. After the war, most farmers went back to
their land and tried to live as before. The same was true of the urban artisans and
professionals. Finally, the government of the new nation was not radically changed from
that of the pre-revolutionary Continental Congress. The American Revolution was a
historic event, but it was not an upheaval that radically reshaped social relations on the
new continent.
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The French Revolution, by contrast, was a revolt motivated by class interests
which successfully altered the very structure of French society and subsequently changed
the fundamental social relations in that nation. The newly created relations were forged
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by ihc struggle of the various classes present in French society at the end of the
eighteenth century. Post-revolutionary France was a new society formed out of the
political struggle and it reflected the class differences that played an integral part in its
creation.
Post-Revolutionary War Development
Hartz claimed that after the Revolutionary War, the psychology of American
liberalism became ail encompassing. The political disputes among various factions in the
early days of the United States seemed to resemble the factional disputes among
adherents to the new European liberal and enlightenment tradition, rather than the
vigorous class conflict that became a standard feature of European political development
in the nineteenth century.
A prime example of conflict American-style was Shays' rebellion. Hartz asserted
that Shays and his guerilla army did not seek to seize the farmland of Western
Massachusetts from the major local landholders and operate these lands as a collective.
Rather, Shays’ army consisted of independent farmers who felt compelled to take drastic
measures to save their personal slice of land during a difficult economic depression.
Hartz claimed that American rebels who followed in the tradition of Shays held to a
similar philosophy. All of them were propelled into action by the fear of losing their
property, which was seen as a means for perpetuating their independence and self-
37
reliance. These rebellious Americans were not, however, motivated by the dream of
winning a new society, like the followers of Marx and Engels in Europe. '
Within these early American disputes, however, Hartz found an interesting
contradiction between reality and perception on the part of the wealthiest citizens of
America. The upper class, observing events like Shays' rebellion, perceived that they
were being attacked by their class enemies, but in reality both groups were ostensibly
looking for the same thing - the right of the individual to provide an independent living
for her/himself.
79
Hartz claimed that the struggle between the perceived aristocrats and the common
Americans illustrated the predominance of the liberal norm among all classes of
American society. As a whole, common Americans did not detest the wealthy as did
their working class counterparts in European countries, but rather the proletariat in the
United States desired to someday attain extensive wealth in their own right.
The Triumph of American Individualism
From this observation Hartz reached the conclusion that will prove to be most
important for us as we compare his thought with that of the other writers in this study.
Hartz stated that the preeminent liberal belief imbued within all of the various classes of
American society led Americans to seek individualistic answers to their problems.
According to this analysis, the quintessential “self-made man” of the nineteenth eentury
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Horatio Alger stories, becomes the poster child for two hundred years of American life. 80
Hart/, observed that the goals of average Americans, be they yeoman farmers or an
industrial laborers, are geared toward the bourgeois "concepts of property and
individualism."
From Hartz's position, we find a nation where governmental action, communal
responses, and specifically socialistic responses to social needs arc seen as anathema.
Such thought, Hart/ claimed, is relegated to the outer fringes of American society. In
fact, the only prevailing communal value in American is an ardent and irrational
Lockeanism that despises anything which stands outside of the liberal norm of individual
o->
enterprise, properly rights, and restricted government. “
As he analyzed American history, Hartz focused on the urban classes, and paid
particular attention to the absence of a committed rank and file union movement and the
lack of a strong, successful socialistic movement in the United States. According to
Hart/, "Marx dies (in America) because there is no sense of class, no spirit of revolution,
no yearning for the corporate past."'
The implication here is that workers will not organize as a class because their
prime ideological objective is not grounded in their collective membership in the working
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class. In America, Ihc goal of the working class is to "rise above" their current socio-
economic status and enter the bourgeoisie; a class-based political and social movement
will be considered unattractive to most of these incipient entrepreneurs.
The Lessons Learned from the Cold War Consensus School
The three intellectuals profiled above employed different approaches to arrive at
their findings, but their conclusions were very much in harmony with one another. They
all began their scholarly pursuits as practitioners (to one degree or another) of left-wing
ideology and subsequently jettisoned their ideological roots once they reached their
professional maturity. During this process, they came to an agreement on the belief that a
transcendent consensus exists in American political thought and that this consensus
reached back to the very beginning of the American experience. Moreover, they
concurred that this consensus was so overwhelmingly dominant that it practically erased
all other ideological options from the public discourse in the United States.
In addition to their general agreement, these three intellectuals reached some
common inferences that will prove to be important for our examination of the impact of
American Exceplionalisrn thought on the political discourse of our present era. In the
following three sections, I will enumerate the most important of these conclusions.
Individualism in the American Consensus
All three use their own distinct terminology to describe the consensus, but in
effect they all settled on the same definition. Unlike Boorstin who argued that the
ideology of America, in fact, was no ideology at all, Hofstadter and (especially) Hartz
were much more precise in describing the most defining aspects of the American
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consensus. For them, the American consensus, roughly, follows the tenets of the
classical liberal tradition. There is a particular emphasis upon the defense of the right to
individual property ownership and a general preference expressed for the interests of
individual citizens over the interests of the government.
Furthermore, Hofstadtcr, Hartz and to some extent Boorstin stressed the
schizophrenic nature of American liberalism. The celebration of the isolated rugged
individual is placed far into the forefront of American political mythology while
collective or fraternal tendencies arc practically unacknowledged by the same tradition.
Just as the individual is prized above the assemblage on the domestic political
scene, the parochial interests of the United States in foreign affairs arc often placed far
above the interests of mutual respect among nation-states and international co-existence.
Given these assumptions, issues of international relations arc most likely to be considered
(as Hofstadtcr predicted) from a strongly nationalistic and possibly even isolationist
point-of-view.
Within such a framework, a foreign policy argument premised upon an “us versus
them” attitude will likely often win more adherents than a more cooperative approach.
We need to remain cognizant of this possibility, particularly as we examine the political
attitudes surrounding the contemporary war on terrorism.
Anti-lntellectualism in the American Consensus
In addition to the strong predilection for the individual over the collective, all
three of our observers, particularly Boorstin and Hartz, discussed anti-intellectualism in
American consensus. Hartz seemed deeply frustrated by the “irrationality” of American
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political thought, while Boorstin found something positive in American ant i
-
intclleetualism. Nevertheless, both asserted that the disparagement of intellectual inquiry
deeply affected the manner in which most Americans perceive both social relations and
their own history. Two important and related by-products of American anti-
intellectual ism arc the tendency to homogenize the American experience and the
propensity to ascribe a divine quality to American historical development. Boorstin's
chapter on “The Mingling of Political and Religious Thought" is particularly illuminating
regarding the second inclination.M
It should not be surprising that there was a general tendency to exaggerate the
homogeneity of the American experience during the Cold War. The United States had
just overcome two of the most significant crises in its history - the Great Depression and
World War II. Moreover, the post-war world order gradually became further and further
dominated by the competition between United States and the Soviet Union. During the
1950s, the danger of one wrong move leading to the annihilation of the entire globe was a
very real concern that united Americans of all demographic backgrounds.
In addition, the United States was experiencing an economic expansion that
would elevate this nation-state to an unprecedented status in world history. In reality,
prosperity was not being shared equally among all citizens, but there was a popular
perception among the dominant class of citizens that the American Dream was
achievable.
Boorstin, 133-160.
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In both these good and bad times, surely there must have been a strong sense that
our respective differences were secondary to national unity. Additionally, more than any
other time in its young existence unity within the American polity must have seemed both
possible and indispensable for the future success of the nation-state.
Similarly, a call for unity within the American polity was alluded to by many
citizens of various political stripes in the days immediately following the terrorist attacks
of September I 1 , 2001 . As we compare these moments of crisis and uncertainty, we
must remember that the yearning for sameness is often a powerful stabilizing force in
moments of volatility.
The Uniqueness of the American Consensus
Finally, both Boorstin and Hartz shared the assumption that the American
consensus is truly “exceptional” as it cannot be exported to other nation-states. Boorstin
made this point explicitly clear at the beginning and again at the conclusion of his
argument. For Hartz, this assumption was implicit; the unique conditions surrounding the
American founding could not be replicated, so it was logical to presume that the extreme
version of liberalism found in American politics would not likely surface anywhere else.
As we examine the exceptionalist discourse surrounding the contemporary War
on Terrorism, we will find some contradictory statements regarding the ability to export
American political thought to other around the globe. Sometimes, the contemporary
exceptionalist discourse will focus on the absolute uniqueness of the American
democracy while other discussions will concentrate on the need to achieve stability by
making the rest of the world more like the United States.
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We will incorporate the three tendencies outlined above into our discussion of the
role of Exceplionalism following September 1 l lh . However, before wc begin our direct
discussion of the post-September 1 llh political discourse, wc must first discuss the
evolution of Exceptionalist thought from the Cold War Consensus School thorough the
end of the 20 lh century. The next chapter will detail this development; then we will
engage the politics of the 2 I
s1
century in chapter four.
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CHAPTER 3
RECENT TRENDS IN AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
Introduction
In this chapter, I will discuss the evolution of the theory of American
Exeeptionalism beyond the Cold War consensus school. It is nearly impossible to
remove consensus theory from its Cold War origins; as we have seen in the previous
chapter, American Exeeptionalism was a doctrine forged as a means to explain the
essential differences between the United States polity and the portion of the globe that
fell under the influence of Marxism-Leninism in the post-World War II era.
We should, therefore, expect that as the Cold War drew to a close, the narrative of
consensus would change to meet the new material conditions. The fall of the Soviet
Union raises several important questions regarding American Exeeptionalism. Did the
United States prevail over the Soviets because of its truly “exceptional” (in this case, read
superior) ideals? Did the end of the Cold War also mean the end to the major
impediment preventing the spread of the American Ideal around the globe? Would the
United Stales remain “exceptional” (in this case, read unique) if the American ideal
spread across the globe in the wake of the Soviet collapse? And finally, would a new
challenge rise against the “Exeeptionalism” (in this case read both superior and unique)
of the United States?
An argument could be made that both contemporary liberals and contemporary
conservatives are the inheritors of the legacy of American Exeeptionalism. For the
purposes of this dissertation, 1 will focus upon the connection between American
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Exceptionalism and conservative ideology in the following chapter. Locating the
association between American Exceptionalism and contemporary conservative thought
will both illuminate the post-Cold War perspective on American uniqueness and facilitate
our understanding of the rhetorical position of the Bush administration in foreign policy
matters connected with the aftermath of September 1 1th.
My mission in this chapter is two-fold. First. 1 will follow the evolution of the
theory of American Exceptionalism out of its Cold War context and assess its meaning in
contemporary times. Second, 1 will examine the “exceptional” characteristics of two
distinctly conservative theories that emerged in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet
Union.
American Exceptionalism after the Cold War
The work of sociologist Seymour Martin Lipsct is comparable and complimentary
to that of the Consensus theorists discussed in the previous chapter. During the 1950s
and 1960s, Lipsct studied various American institutions and concluded that a social
consensus existed with regards to certain fundamental values.
In his 1963 book. The First New Nation
,
Lipsct argued that equality and
achievement were two deep-seated American values forged during the conflict of the
Revolutionary Era. Furthermore, he asserted that these two core values remained
relatively unchanged into the 20lh century. In addition, he posited that these static values
helped to shape and preserve a unique and lasting American character that withstood the
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forces of change brought on by the dramatically evolving material conditions over the
past 200 years. 86
For Lipsct. the values of equality and achievement were not always
complimentary; in fact, he claimed that they often conflicted with one another. However,
he claimed that the conflict between the two, almost dialectically, helped determine the
character of both American social thought and political institutions in the United States.* 7
Lipset is vital to our understanding of the contemporary meaning of American
Exceptionalism because his intellectual inquiry into the American consensus begins
during the Cold War, but is then revisited in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. Lipset, therefore, serves as an all important bridge between the Cold War
consensus school and our contemporary understanding of American Exceptionalism.
Still Exceptional Alter All These Years
The fall of Soviet-style Communism in the early 1990s and the end of the Cold
War certainly signaled a significant change in the global political order. The end of the
four decade-long bi-polar struggle was a victory for the United States and, by
implication, the American way of life. Those ideologically pre-disposed to accept the
theory of American Exceptionalism might further point to the uniqueness of the United
States as an indispensable contributing factor to its victory over the Soviet Union.
Lipset does not address the root cause of the Cold War’s end, nor does he
86 Seymour Marlin Lipset, The First New Nation: The United States in Historical
and Comparative Perspective , (New York: Basic Books, 1963), 1-7, 16 and 104.
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conclude that America's uniqueness always translates into superiority. However, he does
undertake a thorough examination of the status of American Exceptionalism twice in the
decade following the Soviet collapse. In their 2000 book. It Didn 't Happen Here
,
Lipset
and co-author Gary Marks reach the conclusion that America remains exceptional even
though public policy formulation in comparable countries of Western Europe began to
more closely resemble political decision making in the United States during the final
decade of the twentieth century.
Specifically, Lipset and Marks asserted that the industrially developed world
experienced a period of political moderation following the Cold War. This period was
marked by a noticeable shift towards the political center on the part of many European
social democratic parties. Accompanying this ideological shift was the dismantling of
' • S2Q
select facets ol the welfare state in those same countries.
By moving toward the political center and away from established policies
designed to deliver social democratic outcomes, many nation-stales of the West began to
set aside the class-based competition that was a central component of their political
discourse for many decades. For the most part. Lipset and Marks claimed that American
politics has historically been devoid of the class-based approach to party politics and
public policy formulation. Therefore, if one accepts their thesis, one could conclude that
the centrist ideological drift in the West signaled an end to the uniqueness of American
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politics.
During the 1990s, Western parties which had previously leaned decidedly to the
political left, such as the British Labor Party, began to very closely resemble the
moderately left-of-center ideological position of the Democratic Party in the United
States. However, at the same time, the Democratic Party was moving even closer to the
political center under the leadership of President Bill Clinton and the Democratic
Leadership Council. Therefore, as formerly left-wing parties drifted toward the center
(and, therefore, closer to the Democrats in the United States), the already centrist
Democratic Party moved even further towards the center of the political spectrum. 91
After considering the political push toward the center during the 1990s, Lipset
and Marks concluded that the United States remains exceptional in key indicators such as
taxation, social spending levels, union membership and economic inequality. These
factors, Lipset and Marks asserted, are closely correlated with the amount of political
power possessed by the lower class in a given polity (e.g. higher levels of social spending
often correlate with greater political power in the hands of the lower class). Since the
diffusion of power in a pluralist political system is essential to ensure that the government
is answerable to a cross-section of its citizenry, the lack of power vested in the lower
class might mean a troublesome lack of democratic responsiveness in the American
90
Ibid., 262-263. Lipset and Marks argued that, in spite of the pre-industrial
origins of American Exceptionalism, modern claims to Exceptionalism can be reduced to
the absence of a sustained and viable socialist or working class political movement in the
United Slates.
91
Ibid., 274-276.
49
political system.
As stated previously, the American working class has had great difficulty
obtaining and particularly sustaining an independent grasp on political power in the
United States. In their concluding remarks, Lipset and Marks suggested that this may
translate to other groups outside the status quo in the American political hierarchy. If
their speculation is correct, than we might conclude that American Exceptional ism has
effects beyond the Cold War question of socialism (or the lack thereof) in America. Most
notably for the purposes of this dissertation, we might expect to find that elite opinion
will dominate the political discourse of the United States. 93
The Double-Edged Sword
Four years before ll Didn't Happen Here, Lipset addressed the question of
American Exceptionalism in the more recent wake of the Cold War's demise. Lipsct’s
title American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword accurately summarizes his
conclusions at that time concerning the American Consensus. Specifically, Lipset was
interested in analyzing both the perceived positive and negative ramifications of our
alleged political and social uniqueness. As with his subsequent book, Lipset positioned
himself as an adherent to the idea of Exceptionalism defined merely with reference to
difference and not concerning any particular notion of superiority.
Rather than exclusively extol the virtues of American Exceptionalism, Lipset
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concluded that the results of our outlier status are equally positive and negative. He
states that American Exceptionalism has been a contributing factor to the development of
a polity that displays unmatched levels of optimism, productivity, volunteerism, concern
for individual rights and upward mobility. However, Lipset claimed that the same factors
that encourage the above attributes also contribute to a society tainted by high crime
rates, significant inequalities in wealth, low rates of political participation, high levels of
litigiousness and a general “disregard for communal good.”44
To better evaluate both the positive and negative impact of American
Exceptionalism, Lipset endeavored to define a set of exceptional traits to study. He
referred to these traits as the “American Creed.” Basically, Lipset described the
American Creed in five broad terms of “liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism
and laissez-faire” supplemented by unusually strong religious fervor. The religious
component observed by Lipset is important for our purposes as it tends to be both very
individualistic and messianic in nature.
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Exceptionalism and Conflict
Lipset claimed that the individualistic climate in America, combined with a
religious tradition that focuses on human perfectibility deeply affects the way that the
American polity addresses important matters, most notably questions of war and peace.
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As a result of our exceptional ist nature, Lipscl asserted that both support lor and
resistance to war tend to be presented in exceedingly moral terminology. Lipsct stated
that average Americans endorse a war if they can define the role of the United States “as
being on God's side against Satan - for morality, against evil."
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Lipsct noted that comparative public opinion surveys show that Americans are
significantly more patriotic and more willing to fight in their country’s wars than citizens
from more than thirty similar nation-states. He concluded that this outlier status is due to
a dominant popular conception that the United Stales fights crusades “to destroy evil”
instead of wars for specific material interests.
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Lipsct stated that American wars are almost always presented as struggles for
“moral goals, such as the quest ‘to make the world safe for democracy,”' or a cataclysmic
battle against an “evil empire.” He cited the 1991 Persian Gulf War against Iraq as a
recent example of the sometimes tortured logic that emanates from such a moralistic
world view. In the run-up to Operation Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein, who was a
peripheral ally of the United States for many years was demonized as “the incarnation of
absolute evil" and “another Hitler.” Clearly, the leader of Iraq was a brutal dictator who
both committed and ordered the commission of atrocities for many years. However, his
crimes only seemed to reach the level of criticism when the United States was in the
process of launching a war against his country. At that point, the reporting and criticism
of his crimes were exaggerated to epic proportions; no longer was he simply a thug, hut
he was the incarnation of the greatest evil the world has ever seen.
Lipset claimed that the same moralistic paradigm that dominates American’s
thinking about foreign affairs also heavily impacts the nature of internal conflict
throughout our history. United States history has more than its share of deep, and often
bloody, social conflict. Arguably, America has had more violent internal conflict in its
past than any other developed country. Lipset concluded that the fierce nature of conflict
in America can be attributed to the tendency of contesting groups to frame their
objectives in intense moralistic terms rather than in rationally defined material interests.w
Lipset also noted that boundaries are established which determine the appropriate
form that internal conflict takes in the United States. In this exceptional ist context,
“Americanism” becomes an ideology unto itself. One’s loyalty to Americanism is
measured by one's adherence to the tenets of the American Creed. Those who appear to
stand against those basic tenets are labeled “anti-American” or “un-American.” 100
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conflict in American must look carefully at the divergence between groups to determine
whether the contesting parties truly operate from identifiably different class positions.
Lipset asserted that contesting parties in the United States generally do not operate from
different class positions and concluded that internal strife is best describe as internecine
conflict between those who define the American Creed differently.
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Much like Boorstin, Lipscl asserted that the United States is the only polity in the
developed world to have crafted such an extreme national identity. He stated that “one
cannot become un-English or un-Swedish” in the same way that one can be considered
“un-American.” Perhaps, this is the reason that radicals on the political margins of the
American polity have historically attempted to assert their “Amcrican-ness” in the face of
charges to the contrary. Lipscl pointed out that many radicals speak of their mission in
terminology considered to be a traditional part of the American Creed. 101
Whether it is on a domestic or international scale, conflict that is perceived to be
rooted in static moral beliefs is difficult to resolve because it almost inevitably demands
that participants compromise at least a portion of their core values to reach a peaceful
settlement. Moreover, the internal group decision to engage in such conflict in the first
place is difficult to debate rationally for the same reason. Conflict framed in moral terms
discourages resolution and complex reasoning and encourages aggressive behavior and
simplistic thinking. Lipset's theory on the link between American Exceptionalism and
conflict will certainly inform our analysis in the next chapter as we take a direct look at
the specific rhetoric employed by President George W. Bush to explain his War on
Terrorism.
The Connection between Neo-Hegelianism and American Exceptionalism
If Marx truly stood Hegel onto his philosophical head, then Francis Fukuyama
represents the first and most vociferous post-Cold War attempt to turn Hegel around
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again. In summer 1989, Fukuyama caused an intellectual uproar with an article entitled
“The End of History?” The piece appeared in The National Interest
,
an overtly
conservative journal of international affairs and proffered a neo-Hegelian analysis of the
imminent fall of the Soviet Union. Simply, Fukuyama asserted that the end of Leninism
| |p
in Russia marked “an unabashed victory” for classical liberalism. ~
Fukuyama and History
The focus of Fukuyama’s analysis was “the realm of ideas or consciousness.” He
assented to the incompleteness of liberal preeminence in the material world of 1989, but
he confidently asserted that “there arc powerful reasons for believing that (classical
liberalism) is the ideal that will govern the material world in the Ion}’ mn."m
Like the German idealist philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Fukuyama
hypothesized that ideas precede being and consciousness eventually serves as the
determinant of material conditions. History (with a capital H) is driven by the
contradictions and conflict between ideas in a process that progressively moves toward an
end state of human social and political order which contains no inherent internal
contradictions.
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Fukuyama summarized his neo-Hegelian philosophy by staling that the end of
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History meant that “all of the really big questions had been settled.
”
l<b
For Hegel, the
settling of all the “big questions” was achieved within the very limited liberalism of the
Prussian government during his lifetime; for Fukuyama, the end state was classical
liberalism as expressed in the late 2()
lh
century Western world.
Certainly, Fukuyama saw the ascendancy of classical liberalism in relation to the
slow collapse of the Soviet Union, but he claimed that there were other signs of liberal
primacy visible to any objective observer in 1989. He first pointed to the “declining
membership and electoral pull” of leftist parties in Western democracies and a
corresponding increase in electoral victories for decidedly conservative parties. The rise
in the popularity of “unabashedly pro-market and anti-statist” polices was particularly
notable in the global economic superpowers. Furthermore, like Lipset and Marks,
Fukuyama noted various attempts by the same Western leftist parties to moderate their
policy platforms with the hope of regaining popular support. 106
In addition to the shifting political winds, Fukuyama argued that the world-wide
proliferation of Western consumer culture indicated the seemingly inevitable victory of
the political system that cultivated consumerism in the first place. He staled that
consumer culture changed the political landscape of Asian Tigers such as South Korea;
moreover, consumerism had begun to truly assert its power by infiltrating the ancient
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culture of China by the late 1980s." 17
According to Fukuyama, History’s end would not bring about an immediate
millennial transformation. Actually, he expected that the world would remain quite a
dangerous place with part of the international community living under post-Historical
conditions and part under Historical conditions. He predicted continued strife caused by
ideas that were remnants of the Historical world, namely wars of national liberation and
terrorism.
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Exceptionalism in Fukuyama
On the surface it is difficult to perceive the connection between Fukuyama and
American Exceptionalism. Alter all, Fukuyama consistently refers to classical liberalism
as a product of the West rather than an exclusive possession of the United States. The
foundation of his philosophic inquiry (Hegelianism) is decidedly European as are many
of the examples he cites to support his assertion that History has come to an end. So,
given these particulars, the logical question becomes: where does one find the connection
between Fukuyama and American Exceptionalism?
I believe that the connection between Fukuyama and Exceptionalism can be found
in two places. First, it exists as a subtext throughout Fukuyama's argument. Second, it
can be found in the response to Fukuyama from leading conservatives of the day.
In their brief critique of the affect of American Exceptionalism on the teaching of
Ibid., 18.
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history, British historians Arthur Haberman and Adrian Shubert pointed to the effect that
often unspoken exceplionalist assumptions have on American intellectuals. They stated
that the:
end of history for Hegel, someone said, was Hegel. The end of European history
for the United States is the United States, not as it was or came to be, but as it
wants to have been and wants to be seen. European history is studied as a prelude
to the leadership of the world by the United States.
109
In short, Haberman and Shubert cautioned that when American intellectuals like
Fukuyama speak about the importance of the West, they often really mean the United
States as the culmination of Western civilization.
1 1(1
Literary historian Brook Thomas noted this nuanced connection between
Fukuyama's theory of History and American Exceptionalism. He asserted that:
Fukuyama’s argument adds a new twist to the celebrations of American
Exceptionalism. For him the United States' difference with the rest of the
world is over (F)or Fukuyama American values have triumphed around the
globe."
1
Journalist and historian Godfrey Hodgson echoed a similar sentiment calling Fukuyama's
ip
work American Exceptionalism that was “dressed up in a resuscitated Hegelianism."
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Indeed, Fukuyama himself explicitly mentioned the United States (as opposed to
the West) as the prime mover of the world-wide transformation to classical liberalism.
First, he extolled the United Slates for being the first to achieve a “fundamentally
egalitarian” and “classless” society. Second, Fukuyama also credited the United States
with establishing and spreading a consumer culture that he believed marked a sure sign of
the triumph of classical liberalism.
1 14
Given Fukuyama’s position, we should ask the same rhetorical question as
political scientist Philip Abbott: “what could be more American exceptionalist than the
belief that the triumph of democracy is really not an American idea but a universal idea
working its way through humanity with America as its world carrier?” 1 15 In the hands of
Fukuyama and those who were inspired by his theory, American Exceptionalism
becomes something that can be exported to the world community regardless of
differences in culture, social mores and material conditions of existence.
In addition to the subtextual implications within Fukuyama, we can see a distinct
focus placed on the United States in the response of one of his fellow conservative
intellectuals. Irving Kristol, often described as the founding father of neoconservatism,
critiqued Fukuyama’s thesis on the grounds that the declaration of a definitive victory for
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classical liberalism was made with far too much haste. He did, however, interpret
Fukuyama as claiming that “the job has been done and that the United States ofAmerica
is the incarnation we have all been wailing for (emphasis added).” 110 In fact, Kristol
makes it clear that he concurs with Fukuyama as far as the superiority of “American
civilization" (as opposed to generic Western civilization) over “various forms of anti-
liberalism and anti-capitalism.” 1 17
KristoFs commentary opens a window on the manner in which Fukuyama's ideas
were perceived by his contemporaries. Even if Fukuyama was not implying that the
United States was the logical conclusion of Western civilization (which seems quite
unlikely), his essay was certainly received in that spirit by many of his conservative
colleagues.
The Clash of Civilizations and American Exceplionalism
Much like Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington wrote an essay from a conservative
political perspective that attempted to attach meaning to the post-Cold War world. Also
like Fukuyama, Huntington's essay caused a Hurry of intellectual discussion in the years
following its publication. Huntington’s original article entitled “The Clash of
Civilizations?” appeared in Foreign Affairs in 1993. Three years later he expanded this
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initial piece into an entire book on the same subject.
In contrast to the unabashed optimism perpetrated by Fukuyama, Huntington's
analysis of the emerging world order in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse was quite
disconcerting for those who presumed that the end of the Cold War would bring
prospects of lasting peace. In fact, lie criticized Fukuyama for developing a “one
harmonious world paradigm” that was “far too divorced from reality to be a useful
guide.”
1 10
In contrast to Fukuyama’s “illusion of harmony,” Huntington envisioned the
definite potential for conflict and warned that such discordance could escalate into major
wars unless his warning was heeded by the leaders of key nation-states around the
globe.
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In spite of the differences between him and Fukuyama, Huntington also draws
upon a foundation in American Exceptional ism to help formulate his analysis of Western
civilization in the post-Cold War world. More particularly he displays a distinctly
exceptional ist stance in the final chapter of Clash of Civilizations as he attempts to
1 ls Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). It should not go unmentioned that both
Huntington and Fukuyama attached a question mark to their now renowned articles
(possibly designed to spur discussion) but eliminated the question mark when they
expanded their ideas into a full-length book (possibly designed to signal the culmination
of the discussion).
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develop a comprehensive prescription for a safer world order in the 21 s1 century. 1 " 1
Clash of Civilizations
Huntington's Foreign Affairs article and subsequent book represent an attempt to
develop a paradigm that facilitates our ability to understand the relations among nation-
states in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union. Huntington claimed that the end of
the Cold War also meant an end to the strict bipolar arrangement in foreign affairs and a
decisive shift in focus away from political ideology and towards culture as the primary
cause of conflict in the global arena. In short, the almost fifty year rivalry between the
two superpowers was “replaced by the clash of civilizations. ’ "
Huntington was careful to proclaim his presumption that nation-states would
likely “remain the principal actors in world affairs.” However, lie expected the actions of
national leaders to be guided by the motivations of the dominant civilization within each
. 1 23
country.
Huntington defined “civilization” as the highest level of cultural identity
recognized by humans in their social relations. For him, civilization is defined by
“language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification
The doctrine of American Exceptionalism is not new ground for Huntington.
His most explicitly “exceptionalist” work is Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics:
The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981 ). In this book,
Huntington explores the disconnect between lofty American ideals and the mundane
institutions of American politics, which often do not live up to the admirable ideals
espoused in the American Creed.
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ol people.
By this definition, a civilization is the ultimate extended family that is recognized
by people living in various societies. All those within one’s civilization are considered
part of a large, distinct, yet personally distant, kinship bond. 125
In sum, Huntington asserted that those who identify themselves as part of the
same broad civilization feel a sense of commonality with and empathy for one another.
These sentiments are important because they make cooperative action more likely among
the nation-states of each civilization.
126
According to Huntington, civilizations do not have impermeable boundaries or
specific origins, but they do “rise and fall” and “merge and divide." He claimed that
civilizations also evolve over the course of centuries of human history. 1-7
Huntington both began and concluded his book on civilizations with the
somewhat paradoxical claim below. Untangling the two parts of the following statement
will provide us with a key to understand Huntington’s thesis:
clashes of civilizations arc the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order
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Ibid., 20. Within the book, Huntington is not explicitly clear about the precise
number of civilizations in the world today. In various parts of the book, he places the
number at 7, 8 and 9 (26 and 29). On a world map (26), he identifies the following
civilizations: Western. Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox,
Buddhist and Japanese. At another place in the book, he repeats the list, but excludes
Buddhist and Orthodox (45-47).
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based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against world war. “
First. Huntington stated that values and morals differ greatly among people of
different civilizations. Because of the profound differences in cultural mores, he
expected that conflict was likely between countries of different civilizations. He
particularly anticipated that conflict levels would be high among nation-states that share
geographic proximity, but arc guided by different cultures. "
Huntington did not necessarily posit that this conflict between civilizations was a
negative tendency in the post-Cold War world order. In fact, he stated that people
attempting to understand their own cultural identity are assisted somewhat by defining
themselves as the antithesis of their perceived enemies. Therefore, an “other” is essential
for the complete development of self awareness within a civilization. 130
Huntington’s second point is more difficult to discern. Even though he claimed
that cultural differences facilitate conflict among different civilizations, Huntington
asserted that a global order built upon the recognition of civilizational differences offers
the potential for stability. Such stability is only possible, however, when the core states
of each civilization reject the notion of universalism and resist the lure of intervening in
the affairs of nation-states from other civilizations.
Huntington’s prescription is very reminiscent of the paleoconservative tendency
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in American political thought. Essentially, his thesis can be reduced to the vulgar altitude
that people with contrasting identities should “keep to their own kind.” In sum,
Huntington's solution for peace in the post-Cold War world proposes a system of
regional isolationism that would facilitate the development of pockets of like minded
nation-states lied together by mutually beneficial alliances but permanently separated
from the remainder of humanity.
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Exceptionalism in Huntington
The Decline of Western Civilization
Huntington’s perspective on Western Civilization's place within the global milieu
clearly points toward another facet of his thinking; a facet that contrasts with Fukuyama,
but, in its own right, is rooted in an exeeptionalist perspective. Like Fukuyama,
Huntington focused on the role of Western civilization in the post-Cold War global order.
He stated that each “civilization secs itself as the center of the world and writes its history
as the central drama of human history;” he asserted that this was particularly true for
Western civilization.
132
The pretentious belief that Western history is akin to human history should come
Ml
In this dissertation, I am using the term paleoconservative as a means of
defining a particularly American version of classical Burkean conservatism.
Paleoconservatives in 21
s1
century America often consider themselves ideologically
different from the neoconservatives that dominate the current Bush White House,
particularly in matters of social policy. However, paleoconservatives also tend to differ
with neoconservatives on foreign policy. Paleoconservatives generally espouse a rigid
isolationism while neoconservatives tend to espouse an aggressive internationalism.
Examples of paleoconservative thinkers would be Pal Buchanan and Robert Novak.
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as no surprise to anybody. No other civilization known to humankind possessed the
ability to influence all of its fellow civilizations as completely, effectively and, at times,
devastatingly as Western civilization did during the twentieth century. Huntington made
the point that the West remained in a position of considerable dominance well into the
early years of the post-Cold War era. 133
Unfortunately for proponents of Western global dominance, Huntington predicted
that the West had reached the pinnacle or its power and was likely on the decline at the i|
same time that it was reveling in its victory over Soviet Communism. To make matters is
.s
0
worse lor the West, Huntington repeatedly claimed that the global clash ol civilizations
/j
\
fc>
could reasonably be reduced to a singular competition between “the West and the rest” 3
#4
l
with particularly sign i 1 icant challenges coming from the Islamic world and civilizations T]
on the Asian continent. 1 4
In direct contrast to Fukuyama, Huntington did not celebrate the dissolution of the
Soviet Union as the ultimate and final victory for Western morality over contrasting
values nor did lie claim that the end of the Cold War signaled the dawn of an era of
Western preeminence. Rather, Huntington stated that the Cold War contributed to the
exhaustion of the West as the preeminent civilization in the world. 135
Moreover, Huntington cautioned that other dominant civilizations in human
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history wrongly imagined that their era represented the culmination of history. Not only
did all previous declarations of the end of history prove to be wrong, hut Huntington
further points out that such pronouncements often came alter the civilization in question
had already begun its decline relative to other cultures. 1 *’
While Fukuyama asserted that Western influence was destined to grow and
Western culture was poised to become the global culture, Huntington claimed that
attempts to “Westernize” competing civilizations by establishing a universal civilization
would likely be perceived by the rest of the globe as imperialistic. Furthermore, he
posited that such arrogant and clumsy attempts at dominance could lead to a major
conflagration that might accelerate the decline of the West. Huntington suggested that
leaders of Western nation-states should refuse to give in to the messianic impulse that is
fundamentally part of Western culture.
1,7
The United States: the Epitome of the West
The differences between Fukuyama and Huntington are many, but one
commonality between the two thinkers is their belief that the United States represents the
culmination of Western civilization. Huntington asserted that since World War II, the
United States has been the standard bearer of Western civilization; he further stated that
America might yet be the savior of Western civilization in the post-Cold War era as long
Ibid., 301.
Ibid., 58. 66, 183-184 and 211.
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as its leaders heed his foreign policy advice. 1
s
Huntington's prescription for curbing the deterioration of the West is
comprehensively exceptionalist in nature. He called upon leaders in the United States to
once again embrace “principles of the American Creed." By now. the core tenets of this
canon should ring familiar to us; Huntington parallels the Exceptional isls that came
before him with his list of core creedal values: “liberty, democracy, individualism,
equality before the law. constitutionalism, private property.”
1 ™
In the final chapter of his book, Huntington’s focus turns abruptly away from
foreign policy and towards the domestic debate over culture. He asserted that
multiculturalism represents the most profound threat to the West because it directly
challenges the elemental nature of the American Creed. The proper response to this
threat, according to Huntington, was the reaffirmation of the American Creed within the
United States and a defense of the core principles of that Creed against the perceived
destructive influence of multiculturalism. “Rejection of the Creed," Huntington warned
“means the end of the United States of America as we have known it" and also the end of
the West.
140
Huntington's affirmation of exceptionalist principles is somewhat more
reminiscent of Lipset than Fukuyama. He is adamant about the appropriateness of the
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American Creed for the United States and the suitability of Western culture for the
nation-states of the West; however, unlike Fukuyama, Huntington is equally unyielding
about the need for the countries within Western civilization to resist the urge to force
their core tenets upon other civilizations. For Huntington, neither the American Creed
nor Western civilization is superior to the fundamental values of other civilizations.
141
Basically, Huntington concluded that “maintaining the uniqueness of Western
culture” is vital for the continued existence of Western civilization, but those same
cultural standards are completely inappropriate to impose upon others. By contrast,
others have their own cultural mores that are appropriate for them and completely
inappropriate for the West. Huntington's suggestion, then, is for America and the West
to maintain its exceptional (in this case, read unique) position in the world as a means of
forestalling the decline of Western civilization.
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Enemy Mine
In his critique of Huntington, Emad El-Din Aisha explains the exceptionalist
tendencies lie found within the “Clash" thesis. Aysha asserted that Huntington’s
Exceptionalism can best be found in these rarely discussed domestic policy prescriptions.
According to Aysha. Huntington articulated the “Clash” theory for the purpose of
preserving social cohesion and cultural homogeneity within the United States by positing
“others” as the implacable enemies of the Western tradition. Whether they are the
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product of reality or myth, the hope was that the challenge posed by such relentless foes
would unite the citizens of the West (particularly the United States) by encouraging them
to identify closely with the similarities between them and their fellow compatriots. 143
Of course, foreign enemies will respond to American posturing by mobilizing
against the United States in a similar fashion. This poses a potentially dangerous threat,
but Aysha noted that Huntington was willing to accept the risks of civilizational disputes
because they bring with them a corresponding reward. On balanee, the incentive to
participate in civilization disputes is greater than the threat; the reward for perpetuating
the “clash" is unity at home in the face of a threat from abroad. 144
In the next chapter, we will revisit the implications of a search for enemies in a
post-September 1
1
lh
world. In the case of the attacks of that day, the threat was made
manifest as a small group of terrorists, also seeking to make civilizational enemies,
provided ample evidence of its destructive capacity and its ability to expose the
vulnerability of the United States and the West.
American Exceptional ism at the Bridge to the 21 s ' Century
The doctrine of American Exceptionalism seemingly reached its paradigmatic
apex during the Cold War. However, the three theories we examined in this chapter
indicate that it remained a relevant analytical tool for some scholars who examined the
changes in global order brought on by the fall of Leninism in the Soviet Union. Certainly
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the narrative of consensus changed somewhat from its Cold War roots, hut the
foundational belief that the United Slates represents a unique (Lipsct, Fukuyama and
Huntington) and perhaps superior (Fukuyama alone) polity in world history was not
tossed into the ashcan of history by intellectuals of the late twentieth century.
Lipsct provides us with a comprehensive evaluation of both the long-term benefits
and detriments of our unique political patterns of thought. In a similar vein, Huntington
offers us a gloomy, but still clearly cxceptionalist analysis of the future for United States
in particular and Western civilization as a whole. Both Lipsct and Huntington approach
the subject of American cultural superiority with caution and both also express concern
over the powerful messianic tendencies that seem to be an integral part of doctrine of
Exceptionalism. As we move into the twenty first century in the subsequent chapter, we
will certainly revisit the potential downside of these two aspects of American
Exceptionalism.
As for Fukuyama (at least the early 1990s version of Fukuyama), he offers us an
unapologetic defense of American and Western superiority as well as an impenitent
messianic mission to spread the seed of Americanism around the globe in the aftermath
of the Cold War. As we proceed into Chapter Four, we will find the clearest comparisons
between Fukuyama’s End of History theory and the cxceptionalist rhetoric of George W.
Bush. While Fukuyama does not quite fit the standard neoconservative mold, his
confidence in American superiority and his near evangelical zeal are strikingly similar to
the vision made public by Bush in the days following the attacks of September 1 1, 2001.
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CHAPTER 4
BUSH, SEPTEMBER 1 I™ AND AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
In this chapter, wc will examine the rhetoric employed by George W. Bush to
explain the terrorist attacks of September 1 1" 1 to the American people. We will find that
Bush's rhetoric employs many of the Exceptionalist themes that we have seen in previous
chapters.
My goal is to look at the particular language employed by the president in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks. I propose that the rhetorical foundation that was laid in
the weeks following September I 1 1,1 deeply impacted the way the American public
perceived subsequent military actions taken by the United States. Furthermore, I will
show that the Exceptionalist nature of Bush’s rhetoric lent additional credence to his
interpretation of events in the minds of many Americans.
The Power of Rhetoric in Times of National Crisis
Most introductory American government textbook discusses the power of the
“bully pulpit’’ that is held by the President of the United States. Furthermore, these same
texts usually discuss the inordinate power of the presidency both in the arena of foreign
policy and in times of national crisis. Historically, many citizens look to the President to
decipher the complexities of foreign affairs, particularly on matters of military
engagement. Considering this, it is not surprising that, following the terrorist attacks of
September I 1 th
,
the words of George W. Bush figured prominently in the minds of most
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Americans. 145
In its 2004 report on the importance of what is referred to as “strategic
communication,” the U.S. Defense Department provided reinforcement for the idea that
presidential rhetoric is the most important means of both influencing popular perceptions
and crafting support for administration policies. While the report focused mostly on
global strategic communication, it discussed the profound impact that the words of the
President of the United States have on the shaping of American public opinion on
security matters.
1 4,1
Northwestern University Communications Professor David Zarcfsky noted that in
addition to the prominence of the presidency during times of crisis, the average person is
more likely to be influenced by persuasive rhetoric from an authority figure in times of
grave insecurity. Regarding the events of September 1 I lh
,
Zarefsky stated that most
Americans internalized an interpretation of the attacks which was principally dependent
upon Bush's conlextualization of the events and in days following the assault on New
York and Washington. 147
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Labeling Terrorism an Aet of War
Zarcfsky asserted that Bush's most impactful rhetorical decision was to label the
terrorist attacks acts of war rather than something else. Zarefsky's related claim that this
was an “instinctive response (and) not the result of deliberate planning or calculation” is
somewhat speculative (and questionable), but that does not detract from his important
I .IX
observation on the discourse of war.
Transnational Institute fellow Phyllis Bennis concurred with Zarefsky’s assertion.
She stated that:
The seeming unanimity of calls for war... (occurred)... after hours and days of
hearing from the president and high-ranking officials that only war could answer
such a crime.
The acts of terror perpetrated by nineteen men, none of whom were citizens of
Afghanistan or any of the soon-to-branded Axis of Evil countries, could have been easily
interpreted as a grievous criminal aet instead of an act of war. Accomplices of the now
deceased hijackers could have been investigated, pursued and prosecuted like any other
international criminal. Labeling the attacks of September 1 I lh as an act of war was a
conscious, but certainly not obvious, choice made by the president and his foreign policy
advisors.
As Zarcfsky accurately noted, important characteristics of an active state of war
were absent in the aftermath of the September 1 1 1,1 attacks. Most notably, the United
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Stales was attacked by civilian terrorists and not by military personnel from a specific
nation-stale.
150
The Taliban government in Afghanistan was eventually identified as culpable in
permitting the terrorist group Al-Qaeda to train and operate within their borders.
However, no proof was ever offered to suggest that Taliban officials authorized the
attacks on the United States or participated in the planning of those acts of aggression.
Furthermore, recent history does not appear to support the assertion that the war
paradigm is ultimately the most accurate lens with which to evaluate terrorist activity by
non-state actors. American Timothy McVeigh firmly believed that he was at war with
the United Stales government when he bombed the Allred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, OK; however, he was tried as a criminal and ultimately sentenced to
death by a federal court. His prosecution was conducted and his sentence was carried out
by civilian law enforcement officials, not military officials.
151
Perhaps a more fitting analogy is the lengthy dispute over the status of captured
members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in the 1970s and early 1980s.
Members of the PIRA in the custody of British authorities considered themselves soldiers
in a war against the British Empire and bitterly opposed being treated like common
criminals. They repeatedly sought to have their status changed to that of political
prisoners or prisoners of war. In direct contrast to the war rhetoric of the Bush
150
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administration, the British government, again and again, refused to grant an exceptional
status to PIRA members; instead, they persistently referred to these individuals as
criminals worthy only of prosecution to the fullest extent of the law.
In these examples from recent history, we see two global powers defining acts of
violence perpetrated by non-state entities as criminal behavior rather than employing war
terminology. By not considering terrorists like McVeigh and the PIRA as legitimate
combatants, the two powers that were attacked by these non-stale actors denied a level of
legitimacy to their challengers. In fact, had either the United Stales or Great Britain
acknowledged the viewpoint of their attackers, they would have effectively elevated these
non-state individuals to a position on par with themselves.
Considering this recent past, why was the president so adamant about labeling the
attacks of September I I as the initiation of a state of war? Rhetoric not only encourages
people to think in a specific direction, but it can also be used to direct people away from
thoughts that may contrast with the overarching message of those seeking to persuade
them.
By discussing the attacks of September 1 l lh in the context of war. Bush was able
to propose actions that normally would be considered off limits if the matter were viewed
as best solved by international criminal justice procedures. Particularly, the level of
institutional violence considered permissible by the populace increases considerably
within a war context.
Moreover, the rhetoric of war is so unyielding and definitive that it almost
instantly trumps the idea of framing the attacks as a criminal act or anything else that
76
qualifies as less than war. In the face of the war rhetoric, those attempting to analyze the
situation in a legal context arc seen as offering a feeble response to a brutal incident.
Worse, those who sought to employ a criminal justice lens to evaluate the terrorist attacks
appear guilty of trivializing a confrontation in which thousands of lives were lost.
Zarefsky slated that “the rhetoric of war" is important because it "assumes and
celebrates national unity.” When a nation is at war, it is easier for those in political
power to craft policies and allocate resources in the direction they see most fit us long as
they can claim that it is serving the war effort. Also, if the nation is on a war footing,
dissent is much more difficult to justify and even simple legislative attempts to oversee
the activity of the executive may be dismissed as "luxuries that must await the return of
more tranquil times.”
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As we will see later in this chapter, the president used the war on terrorism as a
validation for the enactment of several policy initiatives in the near aftermath of
September I l lh . It is interesting to hypothesize about the different level of support (or
lack thereof) that some of these measures would have received had they not been
publicized as part of the war effort.
Exccptionalism and the Rhetoric of War
The rush to both label and understand the attacks of September 1
1
th
as acts of war
was almost certainly impacted by exceptionulist motivations on the part of the American
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president. Furthermore, the war rhetoric was likely received positively by many
Americans for the same reason.
Yale Law Professor Harold Hongju Koh stated that:
September 1 1 brought upon the United States, like Achilles, a schizophrenic sense
of its exceptional power, coupled with its exceptional vulnerability. Never has a
superpower seemed so powerful and vulnerable at the same time. Given that we
have already suffered some 3,000 civilian casualties in the war against terrorism,
the question fundamentally posed by the Bush Doctrine is how best to use our
• 1
superpower resources to protect our vulnerability?
At a moment of collective vulnerability, the rhetoric of war surely resonated
because it appeared to be an explicitly proactive position from which to fight back at an
enemy who wounded the country so severely. Twentieth century history informs us that
the United States is outstanding at prosecuting war. At a moment of national weakness, it
was surely consoling to think that if the United States could defeat imperial Germany
twice and stare down the Soviets until they crumbled, then it could unquestionably use its
overwhelming power to completely annihilate an enemy who exposed American
vulnerability so completely on September 1 1'\
As International Relations Professor Barry Buzan noted, the “idea that the US is
special because its economic and political values are destined to shape the future of
humankind” is reinforced by the fact that the United States has been able to enforce its
will around the world for many decades. Buzan further argued that over time, the
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unrivaled strength of the United States becomes the hallmark of our Exccplionalism and.
moreover, a good to be defended against any and all challengers. 154
The unipolar world that existed for the deeade between the fall of Soviet
Communism and the attacks of September 1 1 1,1 only further reinforced the idea that the
United States was exceptional (in this case read both superior and unique). The logic to
support this deduction is simple: If United States was not a unique country in world
history, how else could America reach such historic heights as a nation-state?
Because many Americans arc convinced that the United States possesses a unique
and superior way of thinking and living, they arc more easily convinced that the country
has a special right, above all other nations, to protect its exceptionality by any means
necessary. Therefore, threats arc exaggerated in the minds of citizens, actual events are
seen as more cataclysmic, and, of course, the domestic population does not perceive
disproportionate responses by their own country as terribly inappropriate. 155
Given these exceptionalist impulses, it is completely understandable that a
sizeable portion of the American populace readily accepted Bush’s determination that the
attacks ushered in a state of war between the United States and the all who plan or
support global terrorists acts. Furthermore, exceptional beliefs encourage the popular
sentiment that anything less than placing the country on a complete war footing
represents a negligent and unacceptable response by American officials.
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Exceptional ist Language in Bush's War Rhetoric
As early as the evening of September 1 1 , 2001 . George W. Bush began to frame
the terrorist attacks not only as an act of war, but the beginning of a battle between the
forces of good and evil. In the introductory comments to his address from the Oval
Office, Bush said that not only were individuals assaulted earlier that day, but “our way
1,1
of life, our very freedom came under attack.” Bush continued with the statement that '
)
"America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon lor freedom and
I
opportunity in the world.”
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From his earliest pronouncements on the matter. Bush treated the following ij
baseless assumption as if it were irrefutable truth - war was declared upon the United
S
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States of America because of its distinctive freedoms. As Zarefsky noted, in addition to r
the assumption that the terrorist attacks were acts of war. Bush also presumed that the
^
attacks were specifically designed to target the United States as a nation-state and that the
*
l
reason for targeting the United States is that America is the epitome of the thing that the
'jjjj
attackers hate - freedom and liberty. Bush established all three ol these rhetorical points <*
at the very beginning of the crisis and never publicly waivered from the position that all
were “incontrovertible facts.”
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attack was focused upon the United States as a nation-state. Over a year after the terrorist
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attacks of September I 1th, Osama bin Laden was credited with writing a letter directed to
the American public. In that letter, bin Laden made it clear that the United Slates was
specifically targeted and that terrorist forces under his command were contemplating
future attacks on the United States and its citizens. '
In this letter, bin Laden also mentioned numerous reasons for the hostile acts
launched against the United States. The reasons listed, however, were mostly worldly
grievances linked to the behavior of the United States and not related to accusations
associated with abstract concepts such as freedom and liberty. Instead of discussing the
American penchant for freedom, he cited grievances against U.S. policy toward Palestine,
Somalia and Iraq; he also alluded to American support for dictatorships that allegedly
served the interests of the West over the needs of their own people. The only issue raised
in the letter that could conceivably come close to referring to “our freedoms” is a brief
diatribe in opposition to the libertine nature of American culture. I5y
Of course, this letter is by no means authoritative. The authenticity of this letter
has not been firmly established; it is quite possible that this letter was not even written by
Osama bin Laden or one of his close followers. Moreover, if the letter is genuine, we still
have no means to verify the veracity of its claims. We very well may be examining a
prime example of counter-rhetoric on bin Laden's behalf. He may have been recruiting
for Al-Qaeda by calling attention to causes that would most likely appeal to the Arab
l>s Osama bin Laden, “Full Text: bin Laden's 'letter to America', " Guardian (UK),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/24/thcobserver.
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Slrcct.
In any case, this letter gives us, at least, an opportunity to consider bin Laden's
mindset and his motives independent of Bush's rhetoric. There is little indication that
American or Western political liberties were at the top of his list of grievances or
considered a priority in the minds of the nineteen September I l" 1 hijackers.
The idea that American freedoms were the primary motivating factor for the
September I 1 lh attacks appears to be the creation of George W. Bush or one his close
advisors. Nevertheless, Bush's rhetoric resonated with many Americans in the
immediate aftermath of September 1 l"’.
In the remainder of this section, we will see that the language employed by Bush
to promote his three main assumptions is deeply rooted in American Exceptionalism.
Furthermore, I will propose that Bush's assumptions may have been accepted by many
Americans because large portions of the American public also believe the Exceptionalist
myth.
Freedom under Attack
In his September I 1th remarks, and in many other speeches immediately
following the terrorist attacks. Bush cited American freedom as the motivational target
for the terrorists who attacked the United States. Specific commentary to this effect
included, but was not limited to the following statements: “freedom and democracy are
under attack,” the implication that the people of the United States were attacked because
we “embrace freedom,” the reference to “the heinous acts of violence perpetrated by
faceless cowards upon the people and freedom of the United States” and the quote that
“(t)hey have attacked America because we are freedom’s home and defender.” In the last
comment, “freedom” was framed in a particularly unusual manner; it was set apart as an
independent entity that is uniquely American. 1 '’ 11
Bush's rhetorical use of the word freedom makes this term an abstract and
symbolic construct that bears little resemblance to any tangible material conditions. In
fact, as Peter Slevin suggested, the details of freedom when it is used in this context are
simply left to the interpretation of the listener. 161
However one may define it, the operational meaning of the term freedom does not
have any impact on Bush's overarching point. Rather the concept of freedom seems to
serve as:
a political device as well as a source of moral authority. (Bush) invokes the
word as shorthand for American values as he defines them, and treats the concept
if,?
as an argument-stopper.
"
If we look at Bush's usage of the term freedom using the lens of American
Exceptionalism as our mode of analysis, we might conclude that his extensive and
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abstract use of this word allowed the president to tap into deeply held assumptions that
are shared by many Americans. Freedom, in this rhetorical sense, takes on a meaning far
beyond the rights of political participation and procedural liberties that can be found in a
plethora of nation-states around the globe. Rather, it takes on a metaphorical meaning
that is independent of specific material conditions. Freedom, in this context, comes to
symbolize a uniquely American way of life.
In accordance with this perspective, those outside of the United States may
possess certain mundane aspects freedom, such as the power to participate in
governmental decision making or the protection of a considerably broad slate of positive
and negative liberties. However, freedom in its purest and noblest form is exclusive to
the Unites States of America.
Such a rhetorical construct separates the material meaning of the word from its
philosophical underpinnings in a fashion reminiscent of the Platonic Forms. For Plato,
the Forms were knowable by only a select few philosophers; the remainder of the
population could never acquire genuine knowledge of the Forms. Based upon this logic,
it follows that the United States would be in sole possession of Freedom, while other
nation-states merely possess various vestiges of freedom but not bona fide Freedom.
Good versus Evil
Much like freedom, the word “evil" quickly became another rhetorical construct
that Bush claimed as his own in his address to the nation on the evening of September
1 l
lh
. Bush informed us that earlier that day “our nation saw evil." In total, the President
made four allusions to the term evil in his short speech that evening. 163
The day after the terrorist attacks. Bush coordinated his use of both the constructs
freedom and evil to begin rallying citizens around his plan for a military response (as
opposed to a legal response - see the previous section). First. Americans were told that
“(f)reedom and democracy are under attack.” Then, they were advised that the enemy of
freedom “hides in the shadows” and “preys on innocent and unsuspecting people.”
Finally, we were informed that there would be an upcoming military engagement against
this enemy and that this battle would “be a monumental struggle of good versus evil. But
good will prevail.” 164
By using concepts such as freedom and evil. Bush effectively framed the terrorist
attacks as the first salvo in an apocalyptic conflict. This conflict was presented in almost
biblical terms - the battle would be between the forces of freedom and good on one side
and the forces of evil on the other. 165
In subsequent comments. Bush continued to effectively use the term evil to define
anyone even remotely associated with the terrorist attacks. Bush used the label
“evildoers” to define both the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks and their supporters at
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He stated that America will “go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in
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all levels. He informed Americans that all evildoers must be “punished severely," and
apparently indiscriminately, because the “enormity of their evil demands it.” 100
The impact of the above rhetoric is amplified by the context in which it appeared
- a proclamation for a National Day of Prayer and Remembrance. In this milieu. Bush
played a dual role - political leader and religious leader. In this capacity he attempted to
join together the denunciation of the terrorists as evil with the implication that divine
retribution must be sought by those who “in the face of all this evil remain strong
and united"
107
In the days following the terrorist attacks, Bush remained on message, repeatedly
claiming that the attacks of September I l" 1 signaled the commencement of a cataclysmic
battle between good and evil. At the same time, lie continually restated the assertion that
retaliation was not only justifiable, but a moral requisite given the epic nature of the
conflict. Specific commentary to this effect included, but was not limited to the
following statements: “our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these
attacks and rid the world of evil," “(w)e will rid the world of the evil-doers,” “the evil-
doers have never seen the American people in action before they're about to find
out” and his statement that those who offer “safe havens" for the “evil-doers" “will be
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The dramatic dichotomy presented in Bush's rhetoric on good and evil is difficult
to take seriously unless one maintains a romanticized and truly exceptional perspective
on both American history and the position of the United States in global affairs. The
United States simply has not been an unflinching force for goodness in the world,
especially since it assumed the mantle of superpower during the Cold War. 169
As Zarefsky claims, such language encourages those on the receiving end to
suspend their ability to think critically with the promise of a definite reward for doing so.
The remuneration is a comfortable answer to the deeply disturbing question - why was
my county attacked by a cadre of foreign invaders? 170
If the attackers are evildoers, then the population subjected to the rhetorical
argument can more easily reconcile in their own minds the reason for the devastating and
in many ways inexplicable terrorist attacks. Such an argument proceeds in the following
concise manner: if the forces of-evil are diametrically opposed to the forces of good in the
world: and evil attempted to attack the most obvious source of good in the world;
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there lore the attacks can he explained as part of a dual istic struggle well beyond the
control of the average citizen.
Psychology Professor John Edwards asserts that the terrorist attacks were
shocking and devastating for reasons beyond the large number of human beings killed on
that fateful day. The attacks also struck at the heart of American’s national pride. The
fact that nineteen citizens of underdeveloped countries could expose the weakness of the
United States was humiliating for the collective consciousness of America.
171
The pre-September 1 l lh hubris of many U.S. citizens was violently deconstructed
as quickly as the physical structures that were under assault. It is very probable that such
a flawed belief in the absolute nature American security was in some measure supported
by a frame of mind deeply influenced by exceptionalist assumptions. Seemingly, only
someone with a definitive belief of the inherent greatness and superiority of their country
could reasonably believe that their nation-state was immune to a devastating attack such
as the one launched on September I l' h .
Bush's good versus evil rhetoric plays directly at the damaged collective psyche
of the America public. If the perpetrators that attacked the United States possessed
nothing but the most evil intentions, then such as heinous only reaffirms the intrinsic
goodness and righteousness of the United States. Therefore, even at the height of our
national weakness. Americans were experiencing the reinforcement of exceptionalism
courtesy of the rhetorical positions taken by our leaders.
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Values
Bush’s rhetorical claims about freedom, good and evil were further reinforced by
his subsequent declaration that the terrorists “don’t share the same values that we share.”
The non-descript nature of the term values in the previous statement likely does not refer
to anything specific. Much like the other terms examined in the previous sections, the
discussion of values is an abstraction that can mean anything or nothing at the same
1
1 ~>
time.
“
However, if one scrutinizes this language using an exceptional ist perspective such
arguments about values become very meaningful. Most of the theorists examined in the
previous two chapters posited the existence of an established set of values often referred
to as the American Creed. For those who adhere to this philosophy, the American Creed
defines the unique values of a unique culture.
The values contained within the American Creed almost take on an existence of
their own; they are abstracted from any material definition at any given time and also
removed from their origins. Minor disagreements over the specifics of the Creed are
immaterial, rather defense of the Creed becomes an indispensable part of maintaining a
familiar way of thinking and living.
Without specifying the particular values that are in dispute between America and
its enemies, Bush proclaimed that the terrorists “hate our values (and) hate what
172
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America stands for." 173 While lacking any means for verification, such a statement has
the ability to contribute to the creation of an irresolvable dichotomy between Americans
and the Other. The Other, of course, possesses nothing in common with the good,
freedom loving people of the United States. Citizens convinced of the existence of a
Maniehean schism could more easily be swayed to support an extensive militaristic
response to an attack such as the one perpetrated against the United States on September
1 1th.
The discussion of conflicting core values, the good/evil dichotomy and the
abstract use of concepts like freedom seemed to resonate within the American polity.
The message delivered by the president did not only affect the mindset of average
American citizens, but it also influenced a significant number of intellectuals who, early
on, publicly supported the actions taken by George W. Bush.
In February 2002, sixty academics signed onto an open letter drafted under the
auspices of the Institute for American Values (IAV). The signatories included notable
conservatives such as Fukuyama and Huntington; the list also included intellectuals from
elsewhere on the ideological spectrum such as Robert Putnam, former Senator Daniel
Patrick Moynihan and noted “just war" theorist Michael Walzer. 174
173 George W. Bush, “President Pledges Assistance for New York in Phone Call
with Pataki. Giuliani,” The Whitchouse,
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Significant portions of this letter read as if they were lifted, wholesale, from Bush
speeches. The IAV letter clearly asserted that the attacks of September 1 l lh were
launched as an assault against “our overall society, our entire way of living.”
Furthermore, the letter extolled American values as something that is “attractive, not only
to Americans, but to people everywhere in the world.” Finally, the signatories state that
the planners of the September 1 1 attacks represented a “world-threatening evil that
clearly requires the use of force to remove it.”
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The rhetoric employed by the president may have influenced the esteemed group
that drafted this letter. If so, the scope of the impact that Bush's persuasive rhetoric had
on American society extended beyond average citizens and included certain intellectual
elites.
We can find four clear hallmarks of American Exceptionalism in the rhetorical
arguments of the president in the aftermath of the September 1
1
th
attacks. Bush's more
excessive statements on the cataclysmic battle between good and evil lead us to recall
Lipset's comments regarding the Manichcan nature of exccptionalist thinking. Bush’s
strictly dualistic conception of reality possesses a strong religious component. Intense
religious zeal, including the messianic search for perfectibility, is a second characteristic
of exceptionalism as discussed by both Boorstin and Lipset. Third, we find in Bush's
rhetoric the effective definition of an other whose value system is diametrically opposed
to the American Creed. Huntington argued that unity at home can be reinforced by
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rallying against a foreign other whose political and cultural mores are vastly different
from our own. Finally, in Bush's arguments we find an appeal to irrationality that is
reminiscent of Hartz’s irrational American who adheres to certain ideological constructs
in their entirety but appears only to partially understand the complexity of those
constructs.
1 submit that the existence of the above qualities in Bush’s argument indicates the
presence of a dominant exceptionalist narrative within his rhetorical position on the
contemporary War on Terrorism. Furthermore, Bush’s early success in crafting public
opinion suggests that exceptionalist tendencies seemingly contribute to shaping the
political thinking of many members of the American polity.
The Use of Rhetoric to Build Support for Changes in Public Policy
As days passed into weeks following the terrorist attacks. Bush maintained a
consistent rhetorical posture. Repeatedly, we find him alluding to the key concepts of
“freedom,” “good/evil,” and “values.” The constant repetition of the same rhetorical
position was seemingly designed to have a profound impact on the public policy making
process. Built upon the foundation of Bush’s rhetorical statements were a number of
actual policy initiatives. Those influenced by the president's arguments would surely be
more likely to consent to the passage of his proposals into law.
Because there were serious policy implications linked to them, the statements
made by Bush during these troubled times are worth examining beyond a simple exercise
in presidential rhetoric. Specific commentary to this effect included, but was not limited
to the following statements which all came from the same speech: “all of a sudden, some
evil people came and they declared war on America,” "(we) want to talk about the battle
we face, the campaign to protect freedom” and reference to “a mighty land, a land of
compassionate people, a land who wants to help a neighbor in need, but a land who
stands solidly on principles -- the principles of freedom.” 170
Bush focused a great deal on the concept of freedom during his historic address to
a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001 . During that speech, he also began to
connect proposed policies to his rhetorical concepts. For example, to defend freedom, we
are told that the United States needs to embark upon a “war on terror” which would begin
“with al Qaeda, but... not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global
reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” 177
Lost among the thunderous ovation which followed the above comment, was the
recognition that the President of the United States had just announced the beginning of
what promised to be a long and protracted war that would likely extend far beyond
geographic boundaries of Afghanistan and the political boundaries of the war powers
granted by Congressional Resolution on September 14. 2001. As Bush, himself, admitted
later in the same speech, it remains unlikely that the ambitious goal of defeating all global
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Commentary on freedom included, but was not limited to the following statements:
“Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom,” “On
September the 1 1th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country”
and “Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom — the great
achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time — now depends on us.
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terrorists will be fulfilled during his presidency or anytime in the near future for that
matter.
I7S
Not only did Bush announce the United States involvement in a lengthy war, but
he demanded that all other nations-states around the globe join the struggle or risk being
labeled supporters of terrorism. His famous quote "Every nation, in every region, now
has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are w ith the terrorists” may have
received a resounding round of applause from the assembled officials, but it is difficult to
defend such a statement rationally unless one’s subject audience has already been
convinced that one side of the dispute is completely correct and represents
unimpeachable good and the other side is utterly incorrect and represents unmitigated
evil.
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In addition to the announcement of a permanent slate of war against a non-state
enemy. Bush also used the occasion to usurp Congressional authority by creating the
Office of Homeland Security (OHS), an entirely new entity within the federal
bureaucracy. The announcement of the OHS was a sweeping policy move in which Bush
unilaterally determined that the OHS would enjoy “cabinet level" status. Bush even
named a person, former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge, to head the operation before
Congress had the opportunity to create the office by legislation in accordance with the
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dictates of our constitutional system.
1X0
It is understandable and perhaps even expected that the chief executive authority
within a nation-state will react quickly and decisively to an urgent situation such as the
attacks of September 1 l"\ What is unexpected is that the President of the United States
would assume such absolute power to act without either waiting for authorization from
the Congress or presenting justification for the enactment of emergency powers. Such
justification would hopefully extend beyond simplistic rhetorical allusions such as the
need to defend “America’s freedom” from the forces of evil. 1X1
Only days following his Congressional address. Bush again employed the
rhetorical constructs of “freedom,” “good/evii.” and “values" to justify proposed policy
changes that gave the executive branch more authority to prosecute “the war on terror.”
In his speech at the FBI headquarters on September 25 lh . the President stated that “law
enforcement” must have “the tools necessary” to be effective in their efforts against
terrorism. The necessary tools for law enforcement included granting the FBI the “ability
to track calls when (suspected terrorists) make calls from different phones” and “the
authority to hold suspected terrorists who arc in the process of being deported, until
they're deported.”
1X2
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Rather than defend these proposed powers on their merits, the president justified
his request with a slew of claims that were consistent with his rhetorical position since
September I l lh . Specific commentary to this effect included, but was not limited to the
following statements:
The people who did this act on America, and who may be planning further acts,
are evil people. They don't represent an ideology, they don't represent a
legitimate political group of people. They're flat evil. That's all they can think
about, is evil. And as a nation of good folks, we're going to hunt them down, and
we're going to find them, and we will bring them to justice. 1X3
Also,
America is a nation built upon freedom, and the principles of freedom, the values
of freedom. And this is a nation that will not — will not — blink from the
fight. This is a nation that will stand strong for the great values that have made us
„ 184
unique.
Eventually, the necessary tools Bush referred to in the above speech were granted
via the passage of the USA-PATRIOT Act. For the most part, the USA-PATRIOT Act
was a complex series of amendments to existing surveillance laws, particularly the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act initially passed in 1978. The specific changes
offered by the USA-PATRIOT Act were often glossed over by its supporters and the bill
passed in near record time considering the typical glacial speed of the U.S. Congress.
The title of the legislation, itself (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
184
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Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism), was a testament to the
influence of the cxceptionalist rhetoric in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks.
At the signing ceremony for the USA-PATRIOT Act on October 26 lh
.
Bush made
sure to include commentary regarding the moral status of those who might be surveilled
and detained under the many provisions of the new piece of legislation. He stated that
“we've seen the enemy They recognize no barrier of morality.”
Of course, the text of this new legislation did not list “immoral evil doer” as a
prerequisite for one to be subjected to the particulars of the USA-PATRIOT Act. The act
expanded executive discretion, further limited cheeks upon the presidency and challenged
the established equilibrium between public safety and the Fourth Amendment rights for
both citizens and non-citizens alike.
Perhaps there was a good reason for instituting the particular provisions of the
USA-PATRIOT Act. One could argue that the extraordinary events of September 1 l lh
required an unusual and temporarily domineering response from the government.
However, the possibility that a rational argument might have led to the passage of the
lss
Uniting and Strengthening Ameriea by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act, Public Law 107-56, 1 15
Stat. 272 (2001 ); The Federal Judiciary, “Understanding Intelligence Surveillance: A
FISA Primer,” U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/outreach/topics/fisa/whatisfisa.html;
Center for Democracy and Technology, “Setting the Record Straight: An Analysis of the
Justice Department's PATRIOT Act Website,” Center for Democracy and Technology,
http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/031027cdt.shtml.
IX(
’ George W. Bush, “President Signs Anti-Terrorism Bill,” The Whitehouse,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/2001 1026-5.html.
97
USA-PATRIOT Acl does not contradict the evidence that indicates that a rhetorical
position, not an intellectual position won the day for the Bush Administration.
In the weeks following the attacks of September 1 l lh
.
Bush even attempted to
promote his economic policy as a component of the “war on terror.” While speaking at
the Department of Labor on October 4, 2001 , Bush discussed the economic impact of the
terrorist attacks. He stated unequivocally that it was
not the time to be timid, it's the time to be wise. It’s also the time to act. And that's
why yesterday the Secretary of Treasury and 1 both said that we need to have
more stimulus available. We need for there to he more tax cuts, (emphasis
added).” 187
Tax cuts had been a major component of George Bush’s economic policy since
the beginning of his campaign for the presidency. His support for tax cuts was consistent
with and justified by his economic philosophy. However, here we see Bush using the
language of the “war on terror” and not the language of supply-side economics to
rationalize the call for an intensification of a policy that he supported long before the
attacks of September I I lh .
Bush certainly tried to convince the American people that tax cuts were, for some
inexplicable reason, necessary to win the war on terrorism. He claimed that the tax cut
legislation, if passed, would “make sure freedom stands, to rout out evil, to say to our
children and grandchildren, we were bold enough to act, without tiring, so that you can
live in a great land and in a peaceful world.” 88
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Here we sec Bush using the rhetoric of the war on terrorism to affect more than
just foreign policy decisions, but also to promote an important component of his domestic
policy agenda. The impact of such discourse on overall policy making success is
important to note even if one concedes that the days following September I l lh
represented an extraordinary moment in American history. Finally, the fact that Bush
was successful in achieving policy objectives in both the areas of foreign policy and
domestic policy suggests that his rhetoric may have had a significant impact on the public
discourse.
A Reason to be Concerned over the Impact of Exccptionalist Rhetoric
Many American citizens were encouraged to support specific policies of the Bush
Administration not because the president’s arguments were consistent and rational, but
because he used his bully pulpit to successfully tap into the collective subconscious of
this nation during a moment of intense crisis. Bush appeared to frame his rhetorical
approach to the war on terrorism in a manner that appealed to the Exccptionalist
tendencies of many Americans. His policy proposals exploited American’s commonly
held beliefs; the fundamental rationale behind his exceptionalist claim was that
extraordinary measures were needed in extraordinary times to defend an extraordinary
polity from an assault perpetrated by an extraordinary evil.
Some might consider the events of September 1 1 1,1 and their aftermath an extreme
example - an outlier event that cannot accurately yield important findings on the impact
of exccptionalist rhetoric upon American politics. The carnage wrought by the attacks
was certainly shocking to citizens of the United States and people all around the globe.
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Perhaps this is an outlier event from which there is no frame of reference for Americans
to operate; perhaps there is simply no logical explanation to offer for these devastating
acts of aggression. It is possible that the president and his closest advisors, surely in
shock themselves, reached into their bag of rhetorical tricks and pulled out the first thing
they got their hands on. The war analogy and the Exceptionalist rhetoric, as fantastic as it
was at times, may have been employed because there was no other reasonable manner in
which to discuss the attacks.
Certainly, the above caution holds some relevance; the attacks were
unquestionably overwhelming to the collective American psyche. Nevertheless, we must
keep in mind that the use of Exceptionalist rhetoric to manufacture support for various
policies, including military engagement, has a long-term impact that may not necessarily
be positive. A careful examination of the rhetoric employed in the immediate aftermath
is essential because of the potentially devastating effect that subsequent polices may have
had on citizens of the United States and citizens of the world.
Seven years after the attacks of September 1 l lh
,
the United States is over-extended
in two undeclared wars of occupation in the Middle and Near East. Our forces around
the world are strained to near maximum due to these two military campaigns and the
soldiers in the two war zones are serving long and often multiple tours of duty. 1 w
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In addition to the burden placed upon our military forces, the cost of the two
occupations is mounting. In March 2008, professors Linda Bilmcs and Joseph Stiglitz
estimated that the final cost of the Iraq war alone would top the three trillion dollar mark.
Blimcs and Stiglitz summarize this point perfectly by stating that a nation-state cannot
expect to spend that much money “on a failed war abroad and not feel the pain at
home.” 190
Moreover, the reputation of the United States appears to be suffering around the
world. Nation-states from around the world elicited a great deal of genuine sympathy
toward the United States in the immediate aftermath of the September 1 l lh attacks.
French journalist Jean-Marie Colombani summed up the feelings of solidarity that many
around the world had for the United States on September 12, 2001 . She wrote the now
famous quote “We are all Americans! We are all New Yorkers." 191
Unfortunately, the reputation of American seems to have been sullied over the
past seven years by the policies enacted by the Bush Administration. It is painfully
obvious by now that the world does not see us as we see ourselves. On the whole,
citizens of other countries do not appear to regard Americans as liberators and fighters for
freedom. Ostensibly, the United States is considered to be something much more neutral
or negative by many and potentially dangerous and detrimental to the cause of world
peace by some around the globe.
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Unilateral action, preemptive war, extraordinary rendition, torture and the
permanent holding of certain foreign nationals as enemy combatants arc only a few of the
polices that resulted from the Bush administration's quest to protect “our freedoms” via
the war on terrorism. These policies have not been welcomed by the community of
nations-states around the globe. Furthermore, these actions have led to a loss of the trust
in the United States. The good will toward America that was so apparent in the aftermath
of September I l lh has been frittered away because of policies that might not have been
necessary but for our collective myopic world view.
The Purpose of this Critique
This critical analysis of Bush's rhetorical approach to the terrorist attacks of
September I l lh can serve as a springboard to a broader critique of the Bush Doctrine in
general and the Iraq War in particular. However, for the purpose of the specific inquiry
into presidential rhetoric, I have endeavored, for the most part, to sustain a relatively
narrow focus upon the period immediately following the attacks of September 1 1 th .
1 have opted to maintain this particular focus because I believe that it is essential
to understand how the war on terror is discussed within the American polity. I am
confident that a better understanding of how average citizens have been spoken to by
their leaders and how these same citizens discuss issues of war and peace among
themselves will make a small contribution to a more sophisticated understanding of the
191
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current state of foreign affairs for three major reasons.
First, presidential rhetoric on any subject should be critically examined as a
means to discourage attempts on the part of our chief executive to obfuscate the
inconsistencies in his or her policy formulation and implementation. Peter Slcvin cites an
example of a significant shift in Bush's foreign policy priorities that is difficult to
reconcile. This inconsistency is more difficult to evaluate if one is completely sold on the
rhetoric of the war on terrorism. Back in the 2000 presidential campaign, then-candidate
George W. Bush criticized his opponent Al Gore and the Clinton administration for their
focus on the practice of “nation building" and their downplaying of traditional strategic
defense polices.
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In recent years. Bush has made the mission of spreading procedural democracy a
critical component of his foreign policy strategy. By the 2004 election. Bush was touting
the goal of building a functional democracy as a major justification for the war in Iraq.
Apparently, between 2000 and 2004 he abandoned his strong objections to the practice of
“nation building.” However, he has yet to articulate the specific rationale for such a
drastic change from his original foreign policy leanings.
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Second, the president's rhetoric must be examined critically because it encourages
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Americans to adopt a shallow and simplistic approach to understanding the place of the
United States in the global political order. Bush's rhetorical stance allowed him to
address international opposition to American foreign policy with meaningless statements
such as the one below:
(W)hcn I sec that in some Islamic countries there is vitriolic hatred for
America? I’ll tell you how 1 respond: I'm amazed. I'm amazed that there is such
misunderstanding of what our country is about, that people would hale us. I am, 1
am - like most Americans, I just can't believe it. Because I know how good we
While the attacks of September 1 l lh were wholly and completely unjustified,
some voices well beyond the narrow confines of radical Islam assert that those attacks on
America represented an illegitimate means to address justifiable grievances against a
country that posits itself as the supreme and unilateral world power. One does not need
to agree with these detractors to realize that it is not rational to instantly dismiss criticism
levied against the United States on the grounds that America is too good and noble to be
guilty of implementing a self-serving foreign policy.
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Since the end of the Second World War, the record of the United States in global
affairs is complex. During the second half of the twentieth century, the United States
earned the praise of some in the global community and the legitimate condemnation of
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others. To provide for true security, U.S. foreign policy makers and the American people
themselves must, at least, recognize the existence of these complexities.
Third, the rhetorical patterns used by President Bush must be critiqued because
such absolutist discourse can lead to the justification for and the popular support of
practically any action taken by this government, so long as it can be associated with the
preservation of “good” and the defeat of “evil." As James Carroll notes:
What is permitted to be done in the name of ridding the world of evil? Is lying
allowed? Torture? The killing of children. ..the militarization of civil society?
The launching ot dubious wars?
Since September 2001, the United Slates has had to address serious questions
regarding torture, extraordinary renditions, the compromising of civil liberties and pre-
emptive war. Each of these issues along with other concerns that stem from the war on
terrorism are truly controversial questions that should be debated intelligently rather than
settled with platitudes containing absolutes about “good” and “evil."
IM7 James Carroll, "Bush’s War Against Evil," Boston Globe, July 8, 2003, A 18.
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CHAPTER 5
WHITHER EXCEPTIONALISM?
In the previous chapter, we saw that the Bush Administration's rhetorical reaction
to the terrorist attack of September 1 l lh was very much in line with exccptionalist
discourse. However, if the discourse surrounding September I l lh is exccptionalist, it is
not quite the traditional exultant exceptionalism of Hofstadter, Boorstin and Hart/,.
International Relations Professor David MacDonald asserted that the United
Slates is now experiencing a “new form of exceptionalism” in the post-September I l ,h
era. MacDonald claimed that “traditional forms of exceptionalism have been positive
and triumphalisl for the most part,” with the United Stales cast in the role of the noble
and strong leader of the world. The “new form of exceptionalism,” MacDonald notes,
portrays "America as a vulnerable and persecuted target of globalized and irrational
hatreds.”
198
The attacks of September 1
1
1,1
were obviously disturbing and painful because of
the overwhelming loss of life; they also represented a traumatic collective experience
because they exposed American vulnerability. The terrorist attacks marked the first
direct assault on the American homeland by an outside enemy since the British invaded
the United States during the War of 1812.
Moreover, this enemy was something beyond foreign - it also lurked in the
1 V)S
David MacDonald, "America and the New Exceptionalism: The War on Terror
and the Righteous Victim" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International
Studies Association, Chicago, IL, United States, February 28, 2007), 1.
shadows. The largest nuclear arsenal in history and the most technically sophisticated
military force in the world could not defend the United States homeland from nineteen
men on a suicide mission. The United States was exposed and appeared helpless in the
face of an enemy for the first time since the early decades of the Republic.
This position is contrary to the mythology surrounding the victorious and
dominant United Stales of the twentieth century. During World War I, according to this
myth, the United States reluctantly stepped up and lent its might to the cause of freedom
before returning to its own hemisphere in the style of the Roman general Cincinnatus.
The myth picks up a few decades later during World War II w hen, once again, a reluctant
giant is forced from its slumber by a sneak attack. After securing freedom for the second
time, the giant remains on the scene, not for its own benefit, but only to defend the hard
earned freedom from yet another dangerous foe.
There is one glaring constant throughout this questionable telling of history - the
United Slates is depicted as strong, victorious and beneficent. Placing America in the
role of the victim who needs help from others is simply not part of the script with which
Americans are familiar and comfortable. John Edwards states that the humiliation of
being attacked struck at the heart of our exceptionalism.
lw
Yet, the September 1 l"’ attacks, no matter how devastating, did not lead America
to disengage from its historic exceptionalist self-identity. Simply, Americans collectively
absorbed the feelings of victimization into their political discourse and did not allow this
lw
Edwards, 162.
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drastic change to prevent them from feeling special and set apart from the remainder of
the world.
In fact, Americans continued to feel privileged and superior all other countries; so
superior that they were collectively convinced that their country should have a free hand
to confront and destroy the dark forces behind the September 1 l lh attacks. As Professor
Paul McCartney claims, “the American people desperately needed to have their goodness
and purpose reaffirmed after suffering 9/1 1 ’s senseless onslaught.”
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Of course, the prevailing exeeptionalist mindset portrayed the United States, as
the unrivaled champion of liberty and freedom. Yet another important component of this
dominant twentieth century myth is the belief that the United States is a constant source
of good in the world. No matter if the actual historical record is much more mixed, the
myth provides the dominant lens with which many Americans view foreign policy
disputes. If the United States is considered the quintessential example of good, then
anyone who would seek to do it harm must be the root of all evil. For many, the
campaign against the evil ones was something that needed to be fought vigorously and
without much restraint on the part of the U.S.
The leaders of the United States sought and were granted permission by the
collective consciousness of the American citizenry to seek “justice” unburdened by the
standard rules of international engagement. Such regulations were crafted for others,
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who are not as obviously good as the United Stales. The prevalence of the above attitude
in the days following the terrorist attacks is a clear testament to the resilience of
American Exceptional ist thought among the citizens of the United Stales. 201
A Contrasting Theory to American Exceptionalism
Some might say that the staying power of American Exceptionalist thought
patterns is the hallmark of our true exceptionalism. Several authors in the chapters
above, most notably Lipset. acknowledged that the United States is not the only polity
which looks or has looked upon itself as a unique entity. From time to time, in the
modern era, Germans, Japanese and Britons (to name a few) all held strong to the belief
that their respective cultures and societies were unique and superior to all others. The
difference between these nations and America is that, at some point, the populations in
each of these countries were disabused of their claims to superiority and possibly even
their feelings of distinctiveness. A paradigm shift occurred in these nations when
material conditions became incapable ol sustaining such philosophical arrogance. " '
By contrast, Americans appear to stubbornly maintain a collective sense of both
uniqueness and superiority in the face of practically any material conditions to the
contrary. As discussed in the above section, American Exceptionalism has proven to be a
thoroughly adaptable and self-reinforcing paradigm over the years.
201
McCartney, 38.
~ ~
For a comparison between American Exceptionalism and “Japanese
Uniqueness,” see Lipset 1996, 21 1-266.
109
As Lipsct and Marks asserted, there is nothing magic about American
Exceplionalism. Exceptionalism in the United States is simply a foremost example of the
reinforcement of a set of political norms within a specifically defined people. During the
course of two centuries, norms developed within the American polity; as they developed,
these norms had a profound affect upon American institutions. In turn, the institutions
influenced the adoption of norms in subsequent generations. By implication, this cycle
can potentially last forever until something atypical disrupts the pattern of reinforcement
from one generation to the next. 2(13
In his recent book. Blessed Among Nations
,
history professor Eric Rauchway
noted that “the workings of history tend to disabuse people of their national myths...
...(e)xcept for the United States - so far.”"04 However, Rauchway asserted that clinging
to a national myth too long is detrimental to the development of a nation-state. He
concluded his book with the observation that since material conditions no longer support
the existence of American uniqueness and superiority “the habit of being unusual is
leading Americans into unfortunate fallacies.
”
Jb
Rauchway’s thesis primarily concerns the United States economic position vis-a-
vis the rest of the world, but it can easily be applied to our discussion of the United States
in the post-September 1 1 th milieu. Unlike most writers on the subject, Rauchway argued
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that American Exceptionalism began, not with the Puritans or the Framers but with the
Industrial Revolution. For him, the critical moment in American development was the
time period between the end of the Civil War and the beginning of World War I, The
great hallmark of this era was rapid industrialization and economic expansion in an
environment of relative isolation from the other developed countries of the world. 206
Rauchway claimed that the United States, during the end of the nineteen century
and the beginning of the twentieth century, reaped the tremendous benefits of massive
amounts of foreign capital investment and a large influx of cheap immigrant labor. He
further staled that at the same time the United States had the luxury of building an empire
mostly within its own borders. In almost neo-Leninist fashion, Rauchway asserted that
the building of an American Empire on the Western frontier provided incipient capitalists
affordable and easy access to both raw materials and markets for finished goods. The
United States Army’s subjugation of the native population on the American frontier
required some financial outlay, but the U.S. internal empire certainly did not equal the
colossal cost commitment of the empires administered by European nations. By contrast,
Europeans were required to build and fund ubiquitous governmental structures to conquer
and maintain far-flung colonies around the world.
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Rauchway’s conclusion was that the vast difference in material conditions
facilitated an American development that was dramatically divergent from European
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development. Guided by Rauchway’s work and the information provided in the previous
chapter, we ean offer a developmental theory that contrasts with doctrine of the American
consensus.
The United States did not end up with both a comparatively weak and limited
central government and citizens who in Hartz’s words were “irrational Lockeans"
because a hyper-liberal philosophy was an integral part of the very fabric of society. By
contrast, both a citizenry enamored with the myth of the rugged individual and a national
government that was much more limited than any of the its counterparts in Europe
developed in the United Stales because of the strikingly distinct material conditions that
existed during the industrial revolution in America.
Surely, the economic factors discussed are not the only dynamic that effected
ideological and governmental development in the United States. The altitudinal
observations of Tocqueville and many others certainly indicate that there was something
unique about the socio-political character of the United States before the Industrial
Revolution. For example, decentralizing influences can found in the United States
Constitution; some examples of decentralized elements include federalism, checks and
balances and the Senate. Part of the reason that the national government in the United
States is relatively weak is due to the constitutional factors that retarded the growth of
governmental power in the past century.
Yes, the United States is different politically and socially. Furthermore, there are
numerous reasons for the significant divergence between the U.S. and the rest of the
world. However, Rauchway’s theory helps us to overcome the very attractive, yet
obviously fallacious myth that implies American Exceplionalism was akin to a product
that could he breathed in through the very air and ingested through the water that Hows
within the borders of the United Slates. Of course, the previous statement is somewhat
hyperbole; yet, as we found in our examination of the recent history of American
Exceplionalism, several of its adherents presumed that the Creed had an almost
supernatural impact on the American land and people.
Rauchway \s thesis places American Exceptionalism squarely in middle ground
between an unremarkable national narrative that collapses once key material conditions
change and an insuperable meta-theory that continues to exist in spite of dramatically
changing material conditions. He stated that while exceptionalist attitudes have served
Americans “noticeably less well" after World War I, many people within the United
^08
States have still chosen to “cling to their old adaptations in new environments.
He advanced the argument that contemporary Americans can little afford to
indulge themselves in such mythology and he predicted that the dominance of the
exceptionalist narrative would not last forever. However, Rauchway appeared to be
pessimistic about our ability to discard exceptionalism and embrace a new paradigm. To
adopt and paraphrase the words of Friedrich Nietzsche, Rauchway claim is effectively
that “American Exceptionalism is dead; but given the way of Americans, there may still
1 13
20X
Ibid., 28.
he caves for thousands of years in which its shadow will be shown.— And we—we still
have to vanquish its shadow, too!"
-01
We will never know for sure, but perhaps the attacks of September I I lh initialed
an eventful moment in which the specter of American Exceplionalism finally proved to
/
no longer be an accurate lens with which to understand the role of the United States in the
world. Surely, the president used exceptionalist rhetoric as a tool to rally Americans
around two prolonged military operations that led to two sustained military occupations.
However, more than seven years after the devastating attacks, fewer Americans appear to
be impressed by the argument that the preservation of our freedoms requires us to fight
wars against nation-states accused of terrorist activities. One wonders if the president
could effectively use the same exceptionalist rhetoric today to justify the initiation of
hostilities somewhere in the world. -10
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The original quote can be found in Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Gay
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ed. Bernard Williams (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 2001 ), 109. The
original quote reads: “God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves for
thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown.— And we—we still have to
vanquish his shadow, too!"
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Gallup Poll, “War on Terrorism,” Gallup,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/5257/War-Terrorism.aspx. Of particular note are two
questions: I ) Do you think the United States made a mistake in sending militaryforces to
Afghanistan, or not? In January 2002, the response was 93% no and 6% yes: in July
2004. the response was 72% no and 34% yes; in August 2008, the response was 63% no
and 34% yes. While a majority still thinks that the war in Afghanistan was the proper
strategy, the decline in support is significant. 2) Suppose the United States had
actionable intelligence about terrorist operations in Pakistan, and the Pakistani
government was not taking action against the terrorists. Would yonfavor or oppose the
United States taking military action against the terrorists in Pakistan ? In August 2007,
52% favored the hypothetical action and 42% opposed it. Again, a majority supported
expanding the war on terrorism in this hypothetical case, but the margin was fairly slim.
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Moreover, one could conclude that the actions taken based upon the exceptionalist
paradigm have been a failure. In a recent paper delivered at the convention of the
International Studies Association, Didier Chaudct, a research fellow at the French
Institute of International Relations ( IFR 1 ), posited that the ongoing hostilities involving
the United States were the brainchild of largely neoconservative policy planners in the
Bush Administration who were motivated by the same exceptionalist assumptions that
influence a majority of American citizens. Chaudct further claimed that the prevailing
mindset based upon exceptionalist assumptions has led decision makers within the Bush
Administration to make at least two serious miscalculations in the planning and
implementation of their war on terrorism."
First, Chaudct noted that while the early U.S. effort focused upon Afghanistan, a
tremendous amount of this country’s available military capacity and much of the strategic
focus quickly shifted away from the “-stans” of Central Asia and toward the Arab and
Persian world. By placing the focus on Iraq and Iran instead of Central Asia, the Bush
Administration consciously directed attention away from the supposed prime targets of
the war on terrorism ( Al Qaeda and the Taliban). By relegating the engagement of
terrorist cells in Central Asia to secondary importance, the administration successfully
undermined its own slated purpose for initiating hostilities in the first place." '
211 Chaudct, 12-13.
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Of course, there is a strong possibility that such major policy priorities were so
easily shifted because they were never genuine from the start. If we can believe the
claims of former administration officials such as Richard Clarke, the war against
Afghanistan was not the desired point of conflict for the President or his top advisors.
However, the attack upon Afghanistan was initiated because it represented the military
engagement that best fit his post-September 1 l lh rhetoric. 21
'
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The two wars currently being prosecuted by the United States may best be I
I
explained as one implemented to fulfill the rhetorical claims made by the president in the <
I
I
)
days following the attacks of September 1 1' and another that strains the rhetoric of the
)
3
war on terrorism but matches the long-term policy plans of the leading foreign affairs s
voices in the Bush administration. 1
1
This conclusion is complimented by Chaudet’s second point. Chaudet claimed
j
that the Bush Administration’s neoconservative and exceptionalist inspired approach to |
3
the war on terrorism has simply served to blur “the debate on the roots of Islamist
jj
;
terrorism.” Chaudet asserted that after September 1 1" Americans were “shaken by the <
horrible attacks” and “they wanted an answer to the question ‘why do they hate us?’”
Unfortunately, Bush and his primary spokespcople only “gave one wrong answer after
the other.”
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ForChaudct, the “wrong" answers ignored the genuine grievances put forth by
those who considered themselves to be Islamic nationalists. He presumed that as long as
disputes such as the Israel i-Palcstinian conflict remain unresolved, those choosing
terrorism will have a basis to justify their actions, even if that foundation is merely a
pretext hiding their true motivation.
- '
Of course, the “wrong" answers led to action - foreign military action and
domestic policing measures were initiated by the United States on behalf of a population
that generally supported the decision of its leadership (at least early on). These actions,
of course, played into the hands of those who claimed to be engaging in extreme
measures to protect the Islamic Nation. As Chaudct noted, the Bush Administration
conducted the “War on Terror" in a manner that made it appear as a “War Against
Muslims.”-16
From an American perspective, the result of the policy decisions made by the
Bush Administration is that the United States remains hopelessly immersed in both the
occupation of Afghanistan and the occupation of Iraq. Meanwhile, Osama bin Laden, the
self-confessed mastermind behind the attacks, remains free and continues to serve as a
symbol of Islamic nationalist resistance.
The exceptionalist assumptions that contributed to the actions taken by the Bush
Administration have not been reinforced in the seven years since the initiation of the war
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on terrorism."
17
Might the growing dissatisfaction with the war on terrorism signal that
Americans are on in a position where they might accept a new paradigm - one that
explains material conditions better than the ideological yoke of exceptionalism?
Any answer, of course, would be merely speculative, especially considering the
long-term dominance of exceptionalist thinking in the United Stales. Minus a crystal
ball, such a radical paradigm shift is impossible to predict.
Frankly, the impact on the national political psyche of the policy prescriptions
implemented in the past seven years will likely only be fully understood in subsequent
generations. However, the possibility of a paradigm shift is worth considering at this
time, if only to discuss alternative traditions that might rise in prominence over the old
paradigm? We will address these questions in the final section of this chapter.
The End of Exceptionalism?
At this point, I have discussed the impact of exceptionalist rhetoric on post-
September 1 l' h America. In the first and second sections of Chapter 5, 1 have also taken
" l7
Gallup Poll. 01' particular note are two questions: I ) Who clo you think is
currently winning the war against terrorism ? In January 2002, the response was 66% the
U.S. and its allies, 25% neither side, and 7% the terrorists; in June 2007, the response was
29% the U.S. and its allies, 50% neither side, and 20% the terrorists. By June 2007, a
significant majority of Americans believed that the war on terrorism was, at best, a draw.
2) How satisfied are you with the way things are going for the U.S. in the war on
terrorism
?
In September 2002, 75% reported that they were either very satisfied or
somewhat satisfied while 24% were either not too satisfied or not at all satisfied. In
September 2008, 52% reported that they were either very satisfied or somewhat satisfied
while 45% were either not too satisfied or not at all satisfied. Seven years after the
September 1 l lh attacks, Americans were practically split in half over their feelings of
satisfaction with the war on terrorism and the trend was moving toward higher levels of
dissatisfaction.
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a look at the possible impact of changing material conditions on the future of American
Exceptionalism. 1 ended the previous section with the question, was September 1 l lh the
“last hurrah” for exceptionalism?
In his recent book. The Limits ofPower, international relations professor Andrew
J. Bacevich answered the above question with a resounding “yes.” In his book, subtitled
The End ofAmerican Exceptionalism , Bacevich asserted that Americans must awake
from their slumber and abandon exceptionalist patterns of thought or watch the United
States decline in manner similar to other historic empires.
Bacevich stated that, in 2008, the United States faced the reality of its inextricable
involvement in “an open-ended global war on terrorism.” Furthermore, he claimed that
the consequence of this war has been the exacerbation of three related crises: one related
to our declining economy and its connection to contemporary American culture, one of
political leadership (more accurately, the lack thereof) and one involving the deterioration
•
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of military power."
Of course, Bacevich placed a significant portion of the blame for the current crisis
at the feet of George W. Bush and the “Wise Men” of his administration. However, he
clearly stated that the three-pronged crisis, which is now reaching dangerous proportions,
has been plaguing the United States for decades. For Bacevich, the contemporary war on
terrorism launched by the Bush Administration in the wake of the September I l lh attacks
merely represents the capstone of a series of policy decisions and military actions that
~ ls Andrew J. Bacevich, The Limits ofPower: The End ofAmerican
Exceptionalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008), 1-6.
have contributed to the decline of the United Slates in the second half of the twentieth
. 210
century.
Bacevich asserted that two particular exceptionalist assumptions and attitudes
have played an influential role in making the interrelated crises worse over the past few
decades. The first is the mistaken belief among Americans that the world is theirs to rule
and their nation-state’s military power is preeminent and destined to remain that way in
perpetuity. The second is the relentless pursuit of freedom, which has increasingly come
to be defined as the right of absolute “self-indulgence” particularly in relation to wanton
consumerism. 220
According to Bacevich’s argument, these two assumptions are mutually
aggravating factors and prove harmful to the American body politic in at least four
significant ways. First, these assumptions, particularly the First, leave the United States
vulnerable and truly insecure. Second, the relentless pursuit for material happiness and
“freedom” leads to profligate social behavior. The third detrimental effect, closely
related to the second, is the faulty expectation that our profligate ways are sustainable.
Finally, the irrational wants and expectations of the American people fosters the creation
of a political Frankenstein monster - a bevy of politicians who continually makes matters
worse by catering to the petty wants of Americans in exchange for the privilege of
219
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remaining in office. To fully understand Bacevich's conclusion, each of these tendencies
require brief examination.
Bacevich asserted that the attacks of September 1 1 1,1 exposed a dangerous
territorial vulnerability in the most powerful nation-state in the world. He claimed that
the collective hubris of Americans was the main reason for this strategic vulnerability.
The belief that the United States was ultimately secure within its borders allowed foreign
policy shapers to focus practically all of their efforts on power projection around the
globe rather than on internal defense.
2-1
Of course, the preoccupation of American policy planners with the maintenance
of empire was conditioned by the exccptionalist belief that global domination via the
deployment of either “soft” power or the traditional “hard” power was an integral part of
the national destiny of the United States. Inspired by the thought of philosopher
Reinhold Niebuhr, Bacevich criticized this national arrogance - a trait that he claimed
fostered a collective sanctimony among Americans as well as firm belief that the world
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should be remade over in our image and likeness.
Aggravating the dilemma produced by American’s collective feelings of hubris
and sanctimony is the modern tendency to equate liberty and freedom with the attainment
of material comforts. Discussing what he termed “the crisis of American profligacy,”
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Bacevich asserted that the post-World War II era has seen the philosophy of freedom
becoming more often dclincd as self-gratification."
In America's very consumerist culture, the quest for self-gratification almost
always translates into materialistic desires. According to Bacevich, the imperial
tendency, which is already strong thanks to our exceptionalist assumptions, becomes an
essential component of U.S. foreign policy as leaders of the American polity seek to
fulfill the wants and desires of millions of Americans."
For Bacevich, a fundamental dilemma facing the United States grows as the
increasing desire for self-gratification collide with the nation-state’s decreasing ability to
maintain the empire that allows for the fulfillment of American collective profligacy.
Bacevich stated that while American’s collective expectations of material comforts have
increased, their mutual willingness to contribute and sacrifice for the sake of empire has
ns.
decreased correspondingly."
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Ibid., 9-17. Perhaps this is the weakest portion of Bacevich's argument. I
think that he too easily places the blame of American profligacy on average Americans.
With only brief and passing exceptions, Bacevich neglects to discuss the role that U.S.
based corporations have played in generating the overtly consumerist culture that
becomes apparent in 20lh and early 21 s1 century America. He also fails to note that a
significant portion of the population in our inner cities and rural areas have not
experienced the material benefits of consumer culture to any great degree. Aside from
this note that Bacevich's theory lacks an appropriate class analysis, I will refrain from
arguing this point further so we can get to the relevance of Bacevich’s conclusions and
their impact on the subject of American Exceptionalism.
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In addition to the above tendency, Bacevich claimed that the costs of
expansionism have increased over the decades since World War II. In sum, he asserted
that by the twenty-first century, the formulaic expectation that expansionism will yield
abundance no longer applies to the American empire. In fact, expansionism is beginning
to cost the United States much more than it yields. Bacevich explained that the post-
September I 1 1,1 wars did not cause this erosion of American imperium, but they most
certainly have exacerbated what he sees as the inevitable catastrophe ahead for the United
States.
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For those looking for political saviors in the age of Obama, Bacevich offers little
solace. He asserted that our political leaders, especially our presidents since World War
II, have done little to quell the crisis of profligacy; in fact, they have mostly aggravated
the crisis by implementing a foreign policy that has served to reinforce cxccptionalist
myths while gradually stretching the American military to the point of overextension.
One of the few leaders who Bacevich’s claimed made a move against the “Empire
of Consumption,” was President Jimmy Carter. Carter's penalty for his honesty was to
have his ideas rejected out of hand while he was in office; of course, he was also defeated
for re-election by Ronald Reagan, who was more than willing to cater to the
exceptionalisl myth by giving “the American people what they wanted.” Of course, the
comfortable answers offered by most politicians came at a price - a growing national
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debt, increased trade deficits, and an almost unshakable reliance on (read: addiction to)
foreign oil to name a few.
"" 7
These worsening conditions gradually led the country to its present situation,
which Bacevich claimed was simply unsustainable. The attacks of September 1 1 and
the response by the Bush Administration have exacerbated the multi-pronged crisis and
brought everything to a head, but Bacevich is clear in his assertion that the entirety of the
blame cannot be cast upon George W. Bush and his Wise Men. as they were simply
carrying out an extreme version of policies that have been in place for decades and
supported by leaders from both major political parties. 228
Nevertheless, Bacevich concluded that the exceptionalist assumptions which lie at
the heart of our present crisis pose “an insurmountable obstacle to sound policy.” At the
height of its power, Bacevich asserted, exceptionalism might have served a positive or at
least non-harmful role in American policy making. However, he boldly stated that the
country could now “no longer afford to indulge in such conceits.”"
29
In his conclusion, Bacevich followed up on his claim that the United States was
following a policy path that was ultimately unsustainable for much longer. His
prescription focused upon the purging of exceptionalist myths from our political
discourse. He stated that Americans must consciously discard illusions such as the overly
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simplistic global binary struggle between good and evil in which the United States plays
the guardian of righteousness juxtaposed against the perceived evil of the moment.
Similarly, Baccvich claimed that Americans must recognize that “freedom,” particularly
as it has been defined in recent decades, is simply not free; there is a cost, both material
and philosophical to the relentless pursuit of self-gratification. Finally, lie asserted that
Americans must abandon the exceptionalist article of faith which posits that history is on
the side of the United States and America is destined to serve as a permanent shining city
on a hill for the remainder of time. - 0
As a replacement for the exceptionalist myth, Bacevich offers the doctrine of
“enlightened realism,” which he defines in Niebuhrian terms. Enlightened realism is not
a complete rejection of the parochialism endemic in exceptionalist thought, rather it
tempers self-absorption with the recognition that providing for the self-interest of other
state and non-state actors is the most effective means to achieve one’s own self-
• ?3i
interest.
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While he offered the above prescription as a possible cure for the ills of post-
September 1 l lh America, Baccvich clearly believed that the likelihood of such a tectonic
shift in political thought was low. He closed his book with an assertion similar to
Rauchway: exceptionalist myths, while clearly outdated, have a powerful hold upon the
American political psyche. He anticipated that the influence of exceptionalism would be
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unshakable and ultimately lead to the “willful self-destruction” of the, once great,
American Empire. 232
Bacevich's assessment of the ongoing and deepening crisis of American power
brought to a head by the contemporary war on terrorism is quite lucid, in spite of the
absence of a significant consideration of class in his analysis. As the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq drag on without hope for quick resolution, the disconnect between expectations
placed upon American power by its own citizenry (including its corporate denizens) and
the actual ability of the United States to project its will around the world has appeared to
grow into a wide chasm.
Clearly the expectations are impacted by exceptionalist myths. Most notably,
there is a sense that history is on “our side” and ultimate victory is just around the corner.
Other empires in history wrongly held fast to the same erroneous belief that they were
immune to the factors that limit power in “lesser” countries - the fact that these empires
no longer exist seems lost upon those smitten with the sense that America is special and
set apart from the rest.
But is the exceptionalist myth may be all that Americans have to cling to in the
United States. As revealed in the previous chapters of this dissertation, American
Exceptionalist thought has had a tremendous impact on political actors in this country;
from presidents to average citizens, the myth of American uniqueness has impacted
social, cultural, economic and political behavior and the mores that perpetuate that
232
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behavior from one generation to the next. However, exceptionalism is not the only
tradition that is apparent in the American polity.
As revelatory as Baccvich's conclusions arc to understanding our contemporary
political crisis, lie remains silent on American political traditions, both positive and
negative, that are non-exceptionalist in nature. He cannot imagine that a crisis of any
proportion could shake the foundation of our exceptionalist myths, because he does not
appear to acknowledge the historic existence of any alternative political conceptions.
However, for almost as long as theorists and historians have been discussing the
pervasive nature of American Exceptionalism, other social observers have discussed
alternative tendencies. These tendencies have appeared in American society and law
across generations and, furthermore, they offer us examples of principles that contrast
with the main tenets of American Exceptionalism.
In the final chapter of this dissertation, I will examine an example of a non-
exceptionalist theory. 1 will argue that this theory presents us with the possibility that
exceptionalism is not as pervasive and impossible to overcome as many hypothesize. If
alternatives to exceptionalism have been historically noticeable in the American political
discourse, then it might follow that such ideas could form the basis of a paradigm shift in
American political thought as the dramatically changing conditions of our contemporary
world make American preeminence and its supporting exceptionalist myths less and less
materially viable.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
My goal in this concluding chapter is to introduce at least one pattern of thought
that contrasted with the dominant paradigm of American Exceptionalism. My hope is to
provide a convincing argument that the existence of alternative political traditions in
United Stales history might indicate the possibility of the establishment of a non-
exceptionalisl paradigm in the future.
Multiple Traditions in American Politics
The theory that I want to examine in this concluding chapter was developed by
Political Science professor Rogers Smith. Smith provided a vigorous challenge to the
canon of American Exceptionalism in a groundbreaking 1993 article in the American
Political Science Review. In that piece. Smith suggested that the great theorists who
contribute to the development of American Exceptionalist thought, particularly
Tocqueville, Myrdal and Hartz, were too quick to dismiss numerous examples of
inequality and inegalitarian structures throughout American history. Smith asserted that
the inequalities that were considered afterthoughts by the Exceptionalists were actually
central to the American political narrative. '
Smith claimed that the liberal tradition was, indeed, very influential in American
political development, but he further stated that American politics was never as
superficially homogenous as the Exceptionalist School had presumed in their classic
Smith 1993, 536.
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wrilings. Rather, Smith argued American political culture has been complex, inconsistent
and, above all, conflictual in nature. 2
'4
Smith found multiple traditions present in American political discourse since the
birth of the United States as an independent republic. Classical liberal and Madisonian
republican political ideals were certainly present in every generation, but Smith asserted
that material inequalities were also consistently justified through decidedly non-liberal
and anti-republican traditions. These traditions upheld discrimination and the existence
of permanent inequality in America by separating people based upon certain ascribed
characteristics, such as race and gender. 2
' 5
Smith concluded that, rather than unquestionably accepting the notion that the
liberal tradition is insuperable in American politics, scholars of the American political
system should responsibly “analyze America as the ongoing product of often conflicting
multiple traditions.”
2 ''’ A few years later. Smith would expand his “multiple traditions"
theory into a full length study of citizenship laws. His book. Civic Ideals discussed the
decidedly non-liberal tendencies that existed in one aspect of the American political
tradition - the conflict over who gets to participate fully in the American political arena,
who gets to participate only peripherally and who does not enjoy any formal political
participatory rights at all.
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Smith asserted that citizenship laws were a telling measure because, at its basic
level, a polity is defined by who possesses the opportunity to participate in political life
and who is denied that chance. Smith found that throughout American history,
citizenship laws were crafted very illiberally and undemocralically; the frequent result
was that large groups of people were denied participatory rights because of ascribed
characteristics such as race, ethnicity, gender and even religious practice."
Smith’s detection of a regular and repeated reliance upon ascribed trails to
separate those deemed worthy of citizenship and those considered undeserving is
important for our examination of American Exceptional ism for two reasons. First, it
contradicts the notion that the United States is the home of a monolithic classical liberal
polity by presenting a clear set of decidedly non-liberal policies implemented consistently
over the span of the entire history of the American Republic. Second, it helps to explain
the persistence of political myths such American Exceptionalism. The second point
requires further examination since initially it appears counterintuitive to the first point
that variations to the exceptionalist predisposition exist in the American past.
Smith claimed that political myths are, in some ways, necessary in politics. To
successfully preside over a population, rulers must convince those over whom they
propose to rule that they are a single and united body politic. Smith slated that ascriptive
myths worked exceptionally well as a means of achieving the above goal. Ascriptive
myths, however, focus upon differences and therefore tend to unite a select group of
^37 •
Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S.
History (New Haven: Yale, 1997), 1-2, 14 and 31.
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people and anoint them as the “chosen ones” while separating this preferred populace
from the “other” who is portrayed as different usually in some threatening and sinister
way. In the long term, such perspectives facilitate the establishment of rigid and lasting
social inequality with the privileged faction feeling justified in oppressing the out
238
group.
In the case of American Exceptionalism, the myth is the enduring legacy of an
unmentioned but ubiquitous liberal tradition. That tradition is portrayed as a birthright
for genuine Americans. By implication, the tradition is not something that is imbued
within the “other.”
Seemingly contrary to this “divisive liberalism” that is the foundation of
American Exceptionalism is classical political liberalism. Classical liberalism is
philosophically broad-minded and cosmopolitan; its adherents reject employing
distinctness as a means of bestowing privilege upon some inhabitants of a polity while
marginalizing others.
I suggest that the one means of reconciling the discrepancy between these two
definitions of liberalism is to recognize that the ideology of American Exceptionalism has
always been rooted in the ascriptive tradition that Smith discussed at length in Civic
Ideals. Of course, the language surrounding exceptionalism has, without fail, remained
grounded in the tradition of classical liberalism.
Ibid., 6-9 and 31-34.
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Constructing a New American Narrative
Smith's argument in Civic Ideals represents a profound contribution to the
deconstruction of American Exceptional ism. During the course of his study, Smith
ascertained that the preferences of elites have historically dominated American political
discourse. The preeminence of these elite preferences has been sustained by a variety of
myths. The most often used and the most consistently effective myths are those that seek
to divide Americans based upon ascriptive traits.
In the conclusion of his book. Smith attempted to lay the foundation for a new
America narrative - one that is truly liberal (in the cosmopolitan sense) and rejects
ascriptive myths. Smith suggested that national political identities should be crafted and
maintained in a manner similar to the time-tested processes used to generate loyalty to
political parties in pluralist democracies."
Smith claimed that the party model would be effective but flexible enough to
allow for the consideration of the many complexities of human social relations. He stated
that studies of political party identification often found that party loyalty is powerful and
relatively permanent, with few people ultimately rejecting a party affiliation that was
ingrained in them from their youth. 240
In spite of this, party membership is still widely acknowledged as a product of
free choice. Therefore, party leaders cannot reasonable expect that appeals to blind
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loyally will keep all members in the fold forever. Smith asserted that construction of a
national political identity along these lines would force those who create and maintain
identity narratives to provide a framework that gives people a strong sense of authentic
belonging - a belonging that they can buy into without insulting baggage of mysticism
and binary absolutes.
241
Smith attempted to construct a mechanism that would provide a means for uniting
the polity when necessary, while at the same time making room for a truly insightful
process in which people voluntarily and reflexively develop a feeling of belonging to
something that is higher, nobler and more timeless than them. His argument is both
attractive and compelling but I question whether it can prevail in post-September 1 l lh
America.
As Smith explained, elites are often responsible for the construction and
maintenance of political myths. They craft myths that convince a subject population that
they are, indeed, a singular civil body politic and then further convince the now united
polity that a particular set of elites represents the ideal choice for leadership. The elites,
themselves, are hardly disassociated puppet masters. Rather, Smith pointed out that they
often rank among the truest believers of their own mythology. 242
Needless to say, political myth-making is an immense undertaking; guiding
narratives are certainly not something that societies establish or change on a whim. Once
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a narrative has been constructed, deconstructing it and fashioning a new dominant myth
is a herculean social task; one that surely would not be assumed unless there was a crisis
of legitimacy facing the silting political leadership.
We are likely to find either a group of elites re-fashioning a myth to maintain their
position or a group of challengers attempting to assume power by convincing the polity to
adhere to a new narrative at a time of crisis. Given the likely existence of profound
crisis, it is not reasonable to assume that a non-ascriptive myth would be constructed and
promoted under either of these circumstances. 243
If a bold move to re-fashion or replace a guiding myth is unlikely to be proposed
outside of a crisis situation and crisis situations are ideal moments for myths that rely on
ascriptive differences and simplistic binary relationships of good and evil, then can we
ever expect to find a window of opportunity for a non-ascriptive narrative to be forged
and promoted to the public at-large? While such a prospect seems unlikely, it is apparent
that the people of the United Stales are facing a time for sober reflection and reevaluation
of our collectively preconceived notions.
Less than a generation ago, it was fashionable within both intellectual and non-
academic circles to consider the possibility that world history was about to embark upon
an American century (or perhaps, millennium). Now, it is difficult to imagine that such a
llight of the imagination could have been considered possible by serious minded people.
Ibid., 502. Even Smith acknowledged that ascriptive myths tend to dominate
during times of crisis.
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Rather, it is becoming painfully obvious for even the strictest adherent to the
exceptionalist ideal that the United States is no longer the sole arbiter its own national
fate, let alone the driver of history for the entire global village.
In his post-September I l lh book, Who Are We?, Samuel Huntington suggested
that the “salience and substance” of American identity was at least partially “being
shaped by America's new vulnerability to external attack.” 244 In response, Huntington
offered the argument that maintaining the foundational American Creed will become
more, not less, imperative as Americans adjust to their newly discovered feelings of
vulnerability. Here, Huntington allows himself to become trapped between his
acceptance that “a creed alone does not a nation make” and his strong sense that the
American Creed is the only valuable thing holding the fabric of American society
together.
245
The attacks of September 1 1, 2001 may have exposed something more than
vulnerability in the strategic defenses of the United States; they might have uncovered a
latent fear that the American century lie not ahead of us in the future, but behind us in the
past. Huntington reflects a similar pessimistic fatalism in the first chapter of Who are
We? He asserts that “(n)o society is immortal In the end, the United States of
America will suffer the fate of Sparta, Rome and other human communities.” 246
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While Huntington’s prediction will surely come to pass eventually, the immediate
decline of the United Slates is not inevitable nor is it solely dependent upon a single
narrative like the exceptionalist myth. In contrast to Huntington, I believe that embracing
multiple identities might be a source of great intellectual strength for Americans.
Moreover, it may be the only alternative that allows the United States to continue as a
major power (likely among several others).
The exceptionalist myth can no longer provide Americans with the answers they
seek concerning their domestic political relationships. Furthermore, it likely hinders the
ability of Americans to craft meaningful connections with “others” around the globe.
Now may be the time for a new and more comprehensive narrative. I am unsure if the
American polity is up to the task, but 1 am quite sure that it is a necessary venture as
humankind moves forward into a century that will be marked by more and more complex
and likely more and more conflictual identities.
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